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 What explains the persistent disparate enrollment of black students in gifted and 
talented education programs?   The bulk of the literature attributes these enrollment 
patterns to teacher bias against black students, a lack of knowledge about how giftedness 
manifests itself in black youth, and the apathy of black parents in the identification 
process. I argue that disparate enrollment persists because of a participation paradox in 
education. Politicians and policymakers encourage black parents to become involved in 
the identification process. However, educators are resistant when members of the black 
community advocate for access to GATE in the same ways that white parents do so 
because these forms of participation threaten educators’ status as identification experts.  
More specifically, I argue that the distribution of GATE enrollments is a function of how 
state and federal governments structure the relationship between education advocates 






that educational outcomes are less a function of teacher bias and parent motivation than 
they are a function of strategic professional responses to political pressure.   
 I develop the theory of proprietary threat which addresses the question of how 
democratic responsiveness is achieved in the areas of government where bureaucratic 
agents are poised to provide the most immediate response to the public.  The theory of 
proprietary threat elaborates on the policy implementer’s decision-making process when 
facing competing claims for public goods within environments with various power-
sharing arrangements between national, state, and local governments.  The theory posits 
that policy implementers who want to maintain their status as the primary experts in their 
fields will be preemptive in policy implementation when members of the public are likely 
to engage in activities that copy and compete with their services.  I employ a multiple-
level mixed methods research strategy. The analysis includes an in-depth case study of 
state legislations and statistical analyses of the Project on Human Development in 
Chicago Neighborhoods Survey.   









Black Gifted Students and the Participation Paradox 
Black students in gifted and talented education programs 
 Gifted and talented education (or GATE) programs are advanced learning 
opportunities offered in public schools throughout the nation.  They provide opportunities 
for students to acquire sophisticated skills and learning techniques earlier and at a quicker 
pace than students would acquire them in the regular classroom.  A student’s 
participation in GATE generally begins in the second grade so that the benefits of 
enrollment accumulate early in the academic career.  This creates a substantial divide 
between participants and non-participants in consistent exposure to critical thinking 
processes and analytical techniques, thereby contributing to differential rates of learning 
and gaps in their performances on standardized tests.     
 Race historically has been one of the fault lines along which participation in 
GATE is structured.  Many school districts adopted GATE as a racial-balancing tool after 
the passage of Brown vs. Board of Education – some to facilitate compliance with the 
ruling by attracting upper and middle-class white students to school districts with 
substantial minority populations and others to subvert integration by creating all-white 
classrooms within ‘desegregated’ schools (Patterson, 2001).  Despite federal calls for less 
racial disparity in enrollment beginning in the early 1970’s (Marland, 1971), this form of 






  In 2000, African American students accounted for about seventeen-percent of 
public school students, but were only eight-percent of the GATE population; Latinos, 
who were about sixteen-percent of public school students, were about ten-percent of the 
GATE population; and non-Hispanic white students, who were about 62-percent of 
public school students made up about 74-percent of the GATE population.  Disparity in 
enrollment rates persists for racial groups even when controlling for socio-economic 
status such that upper- and middle-class African American students are less likely to be 
enrolled in GATE programs than are poor white students (Lockwood, 2007; Donovan 
and Cross, 2002).   
 The drastic and persistent under-enrollment of black students in GATE has been 
attributed to teacher bias against black students, a lack of knowledge about how 
giftedness manifests itself in black youth, and the apathy of black parents in the 
identification process.  In response, researchers and policymakers have looked for more 
efficient and accurate ways to measure and identify giftedness, worked to develop and 
disseminate policies that would clarify the identification process, and created programs 
and policies to involve more parents in the gifted identification process.  To varying 
degrees and in different places these interventions have modified enrollment patterns; yet, 
the enrollment disparity remains and is still quite large.  If these interventions have not 
worked, then are the disparities simply a reflection of student ability or is there some 








A political institutions explanation of persistent GATE disparity 
 Imagine a state in which twenty-eight percent of the population is minority and 
just under twenty percent of the population is African American.  The state is located in 
the Southern part of the United States.  It houses a branch of the National Research 
Center on the Gifted and Talented– the research organization funded by the United States 
Department of Education and charged with identifying the causes of and remedies for the 
under-enrollment of African American students in gifted and talented education.   The 
legislation regulating gifted and talented education in the state is attentive to the 
underrepresentation of African American students in the program.  It takes responsibility 
for addressing the underrepresentation problem by requiring that school district plans for 
gifted education include, 
“assurances that (i) testing and evaluative materials selected and 
administered are sensitive to cultural, racial, and linguistic differences 
[and] (ii) identification procedures are constructed so that they identify 
high potential/ability in all underserved culturally diverse, low socio-
economic, and disabled populations... (8 VAC 20-40-60)” 
 
In this state, the legislation sets up a system for monitoring how students are identified 
for program participation and which students are identified for program participation. It 
clearly details the hierarchy for the monitoring relationship between parents, school 
districts and the state.  The legislation does not allow educators to decide if they are 
successful; instead, state officials determine the success of program implementation.  
Finally, it includes provisions for parent participation in the identification process.   
 This state is Virginia.  Despite the fact that  many of the regulatory characteristics 






more equitable enrollments of African American students in gifted education programs, 
African American students are highly underrepresented in the state.  In the year 2000, 
almost twenty-seven percent of Virginia’s 1.1. million public school students were 
African American. Just under ten percent of the public school students in Virginia were 
enrolled in gifted and talented education programs (110,357) and only nine percent of 
those students were African American.  Thus, in the year 2000, African American 
students were under-enrolled in gifted and talented education programs by sixty-six 
percent in Virginia.        
Figure 1.1 Enrollment Patterns of African American Students in Virginia 




African American Not African American




African American Not African American
 
 Now imagine a second Southern state.  This state is twenty percent minority and 
sixteen percent African American.  It does not house a branch of the National Research 
Center on the Gifted and Talented, yet the legislation is quite similar to that of the first 
state:  The legislation in this state also assigns responsibility for addressing the 
underrepresentation problem to state rather than local officials.  It sets up a system for 
monitoring how students are identified for program participation and which students are 






relationship and like the first one, it does not allow for peripheral accountability. Finally, 
it includes provisions for parent participation in the identification process.   
 This second state is Tennessee.  The prospects for gifted and talented enrollment 
are higher for African American students in Tennessee than they are in Virginia.  In 
2000, thirty-three percent of Tennessee’s nine-hundred thousand public school students 
were enrolled in gifted and talented education programs.  About twenty-four percent of 
the school population was African American and almost twenty-nine percent of the gifted 
and talented program enrollees were African American.  African American students were 
over-represented in Tennessee’s gifted and talented education programs by eighteen-
percent. 
Figure 1.2 Enrollment Patterns of African American Students in Tennessee 
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African American Not African American
 
 What accounts for the differences in the enrollment gaps for African American 
students in Virginia and Tennessee?  The critical variation in regulation for these two 
states is the ways in which they incorporate parents into the identification process.1
                                                 
1 I compare these legislations in more detail and with respect to other state legislations in Chapter 3 of this 
dissertation. 
 The 






does not discuss a plan to educate parents about the identification process nor does it 
articulate the processes through which they may refer their children for identification.  
Thus, parents must have external knowledge about GATE and gifted identification to 
participate in the identification process.   
 The Tennessee legislation, on the other hand, includes provisions that allow 
African American parents and community members to be very active participants in the 
gifted identification process.  It requires school districts to disseminate information on 
giftedness, the identification process for program participation, and the ways that parents 
and community members can become involved broadly.  The ways in which parents are 
to be notified about gifted and talented education are highly specified in this legislation.  
Moreover, the implementation and effectiveness of the notification procedures are 
monitored.  With such detailed notification plans, the Tennessee legislation attempts to 
broaden the scope of the public that can effectively participate in the identification 
process.  
 The Tennessee legislation broadens the participatory scope of gifted identification 
in two ways.  First, it explicitly invites African American parents and communities into 
the gifted identification process.  Secondly, it legitimizes the participation of these 
advocates in the identification process and accepts responsibility for their participation.  
In doing so, it signals to district educators that both educators and political leaders 
themselves will be held accountable for the incorporation of these actors into the 
education process, creating an explicitly political mechanism for the regulation of gifted 






moderate the imbalances in opportunities to participate in education and the effectiveness 
of participation on the distribution of educational goods.  They use political mechanisms 
to alter educators’ responses to members of privileged and non-privileged  classes. 
A participation paradox: Group-based differential responses to parent participation 
 The association of enrollment rates and the structure of the participatory clauses 
in the Tennessee and Virginia legislations highlights a paradox in education advocacy: 
the widespread acceptance of game-changing participation on behalf of white students 
coupled with the conditional acceptance of the same activities on behalf of black 
students.  In this dissertation, I work to explain the persistence of this phenomenon which 
I refer to as the ‘participation paradox’ in education.  Politicians and policymakers 
encourage black parents to become involved in education. However, educators are 
resistant when members of the black community advocate for educational goods in the 
same ways that white parents do so because these forms of participation threaten 
educators’ status as experts. 
 I attribute this paradox to the ways in which participation in public life is 
circumscribed and interpreted through race.  I argue that because of the historical 
meanings of race and their implications for contemporary life, certain forms of 
participation in public life by African Americans can be discounted by public officials.  
The ability to discount black public participation factors into educators’ calculations of 
who can legitimately sanction their actions  which results in asymmetrical responsiveness 






policy outcomes.  I argue that this imbalance can be modified through the state and 
federal governance structure. 
 Parent advocacy and educator accountability are posited as two ends of the 
spectrum for reversing achievement gap trends.  On one end of the spectrum, educators 
are held responsible for educational outcomes.  At the far end of the spectrum is the 
extreme version of parent advocacy, parental choice.  In theory, the possibility of 
activating parental choice arrangements serves as the stick to ensure educator compliance 
with accountability regulations.  However, the focused attention on parent participation in 
education and the related policy recommendations make several assumptions about the 
relationship between school districts and parents that alter the effectiveness of the 
accountability-choice paradigm for African American students.   
 The first of these assumptions is that school districts interact the same way with 
all parents.  More poignantly, they assume that educators interact the same way with 
black parents and white parents.  A rather large historical record attests to the contrary 
and a central task in this dissertation is to understand the implications of these 
asymmetric relationships on the enrollment disparity and on the design of education 
policy.  The second of these assumptions is that the returns to parental effort are constant.  
This assumption ignores the fact that education is a limited and valuable good.  Even if 
school districts interacted with black and white parents the same way, the same parent 
actions for equally intelligent students may not result in the same outcomes.  Centering 
the study on gifted and talented education programs which are elite and selective prevents 






 The final assumption that I interrogate is that all interactions between parents and 
educators are productive; that they have a positive impact on the relationship between 
parents and educators as well as educational outcomes.  This assumption is not 
justifiable.  While the fallacy is easily identified when considering the historical 
relationship between black parents and educators, it is generally applicable to the 
relationship between all parents and educators.   
 Parents engage in two types of participation in education -- involvement and 
intervention.  Involvement activities tend to support the educational administration in its 
current form.  They help to reinforce the activities taking place in the classroom and to 
increase educators’ capacities to continue these activities.  The underlying premise of 
parent intervention, on the other hand, is to change the course of action of the 
administration, frequently by engaging in activities that replicate and compete with those 
of the educator.  Educators are receptive to involvement activities but resent and work to 
avoid intervention activities.  Differential response by race to the two types of parental 
participation exacerbates the gaps in academic achievement.   
A theoretical foundation for parent participation in education 
 I develop the theory of proprietary threat to explain how race-based responses to 
participation in the education process alter policy outcomes and how this relationship can 
be structured by political institutions.  The theory of proprietary threat posits (1) that 
policy implementers who want to maintain their status as the primary experts in their 
fields will be preemptive in policy implementation when clients or members of the public 






their calculation of when such a threat is present can be altered through the distribution of 
incentives and sanctions by political overseers.  This means that educators who want to 
be considered the primary experts in gifted and talented identification will distribute 
enrollments preemptively to students for whom parents or community members will 
lobby successfully for gifted identification and that educators’ calculations of when this is 
likely to happen change based on who the state and federal governments incorporate into 
the gifted identification process.   
 The theory of proprietary threat has three main components: proprietary threat, 
proprietary threat response, and the credible threat mechanism.  Proprietary threat refers 
to policy implementers’ general aversion to encroachment on a policy implementation 
space.  Policy implementers want to maximize control over their realm of policy and are 
resistant to the efforts of others to reduce their control.  Proprietary threat response refers 
to the efforts in which policy implementers engage to prevent a reduction in their power 
by the encroachment of others on the implementation space.   
 The credible threat mechanism refers to policy implementers’ methods of 
selecting strategies to respond to encroachment efforts.  Policy implementers have three 
possible responses to proprietary threat:  They can choose to ignore their aversion and 
become collaborators with those who infringe on the implementation space; they can 
resist the collaborators once they have entered the implementation space; or they can 
neutralize the threat by engaging in activities that will stymie the encroachment of 






person presenting a threat  to lobby successfully for their preferred policy outcomes by 
reducing the policy implementer’s control over the implementation space.   
 Five claims follow from the theory of proprietary threat.  The  first claim is that 
policy implementers prefer to act preemptively when facing credible threats.  Threat 
credibility is determined by the external actor’s ability and willingness to engage in 
activities that will reduce the implementers’ control of the implementation space.  When 
the actors’ activities will reduce implementers’ control over the implementation space, 
threat is credible; when the actors’ activities will not reduce implementers’ control over 
the implementation space, threat is not credible.  The second claim of the theory of 
proprietary threat is that policy implementers use the individual characteristics of external 
actors as indicators of threat credibility.   
 The third claim is that the rules governing a policy space (as determined by higher 
levels of government) alter implementers’ calculation of whether or not an individual 
poses a credible threat.  In setting the standards for responsiveness to external actors, the 
governance structure creates the boundaries of citizenship.  The manner in which a 
governance structure defines the boundaries of citizenship depends on public conceptions 
about how the policy should be implemented and how responsive governance structures 
are to the public.  This is the fourth claim of the theory of proprietary threat.  The fifth 
claim of the theory of proprietary threat is that the extent to which any one part of the 
governance structure is responsive to the public is determined by its ability to reinforce 
its position and the pressure it receives from other parts of the governance structure.  The 






Findings and implications 
 The rates at which African American students are underrepresented in gifted and 
talented education programs vary with the structures in place that (1) regulate the 
participation of African Americans in the identification process and (2) regulate the 
relationship between African Americans and district educators.  African American 
enrollment rates are highest in states where the legislation delineates accountability 
relationships between parents, school districts and the state.  However, while these two-
level accountability systems work to mitigate enrollment disparity, they are not strong 
enough to ensure proportional enrollment for African American students.  In order to 
balance outcomes, the governance structure must also explicitly incorporate the 
historically disempowered African American community into the policy process.  The 
enrollment gaps in gifted and talented education programs are closed when African 
Americans as a group are empowered politically in the education process and when that 
power is subsidized at the local level with political and procedural support from higher 
levels of government. 
 When African Americans are incorporated into the education process and their 
participation is subsidized by higher levels of government, the participation of African 
American parents in the education process counts just as strongly as it does for parents of 
other races.  Moreover, parent advocacy, community advocacy, and credible threats from 
parents and the African American community are stronger correlates of enrollment in 
GATE than are students’ individual IQ test scores.  Therefore is it imperative that 






process.  More importantly, parents need to be informed of their ability to participate in 
the process and the superstructure in place needs to facilitate the effectiveness of their 
participation.   
 Comprehensively, I find that the political incorporation of the African American 
community into the identification process is a necessary mechanism for eliminating the 
enrollment gap in gifted and talented education.  Doing so may have effects on the level 
of advocacy on behalf of students but it is critical because it has implications for the ways 
that educators will navigate the participatory environment.  Advocacy on behalf of 
African American students means little if educators face no consequences for ignoring it 
or if the consequences of ignoring the advocacy are much smaller than the consequences 
of ignoring competing claims.  The political incorporation of the African American 
community into the education process institutionalizes the importance of the African 
American community relative to communities voicing competing claims for educational 
goods, making members of the African American community effective education 
advocates. 
Previews of the upcoming chapters 
 In the upcoming chapters I develop and test the theory of proprietary threat using 
the participation paradox for gifted and talented education as a lens.  In chapter two, The 
Theory of Proprietary Threat, I present in detail the theory of proprietary threat.  I 
discuss the conditions that induce proprietary threat response and its implications for 
racial communities.  I explain what this means for black communities seeking 






 Chapter three, Setting the Agenda: A Legislative Foundation for Proprietary 
Threat, lays the groundwork for the argument that states exercise control over outcomes 
by institutionalizing the relationship between policy implementers (educators) and 
service recipients (education advocates).  I argue that enrollment in gifted and talented 
education programs varies with state-level guidelines about access to gifted education 
and who can make claims on this access.  The analysis in this chapter outlines four types 
of relationships that states legislate between educators and education advocates and 
demonstrates that the enrollment gap between black and white students is lowest in states 
that specifically legislate interactions between educators and the black community.  With 
this analysis I argue that the state sets the agenda between educators and education 
advocates and that when states do so with attention to imbalances in power, resources, 
and prestige across racial communities, states can moderate the levels of racial disparity 
in educational outcomes. 
 After establishing the relationship between legislative control and enrollment 
disparity in chapter three, I test the implications of the theory of proprietary threat for 
individual outcomes in chapter four, Too Protective to Coproduce: Proprietary Threat 
Response in a Participatory Policy Environment..  I use hierarchical linear modeling to 
identify the correlates of enrollment in gifted and talented education programs within a 
city where legislative and policy constraints have created an environment amenable to 
proprietary threat.  Estimating the effects of education advocacy and advocate threat 
credibility on enrollment, I argue that proprietary threat response rather than coproductive 
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The Theory of Proprietary Threat 
 
 
 If political institutions are the rules governing political actions (Sin, 2007; Cox 
and McCubbins, 2005; Krehbiel, 1998; Krehbiel, 1991; Shepsle and Weingast, 1987), 
then what are their effects on policy outcomes?  Among the answers offered by 
McCubbins et al (1989, 1987), two are of particular importance for thinking about the 
role of parent participation in reducing the disparity in gifted and talented education 
programs.  The first is that they shape the actions of agents who implement policy.  The 
second is that they create, empower, and legitimize advocacy communities.2
                                                 
2 I use the term ‘advocacy community’ to refer to actors external to a government agency who engage that 
agency for policy outcomes.  An advocacy community may be comprised of one or more actors.  Members 
of an advocacy community may be public officials but their designation as community advocates applies 
only when they are working outside of their official capacities.  Thus teachers are members of an 
educational advocacy community when they are engaging the school district for educational outcomes as 
citizens (i.e., in a protest, in letter to the district, or in a newspaper editorial) but now when they are 
advocating for these same goals in their official capacities as teachers (i.e., at a staff meeting or school in-
service function).  Their status as teachers may affect how the school district perceives their requests but 
their advocacy is nevertheless understood as an external engagement of the district rather than an internal 
engagement. 
   Indeed, 
McCubbins et al, focusing on the ability of politicians to control bureaucratic agencies 
with administrative procedures, write about the alteration of advocacy communities as a 
mechanism to control the actions of policy implementers (see also McCubbins and 
Schwartz, 1984).  In doing so, they highlight the altered accessibility of the political 
landscape to policy advocates but do not specify the process by which policy advocates 







 On the other hand, the opportunity structure framework in the political 
participation literature does address how opportunity structures change the participatory 
strategies of advocacy communities (Platt and Harris, 2006; Klinkner and Smith, 2002; 
Mettler, 1998).  Yet, this line of research is removed from the institutional control 
literature and therefore does not specify the influence of political control on the 
participatory behaviors of the advocacy community.  Moreover, it does not offer 
systematic evidence on the resulting policy outcomes.  I address the disconnect between 
the two literatures with a theoretical framework which links these two pieces of the 
policy outcomes puzzle -- governance and mass participation, creating the path for a 
systematic analysis of the influence of political control on participatory behavior and 
policy outcomes.   
 I ask how the strategies of the federal and state governments for governing gifted 
and talented education programs affect how school districts and parents engage each 
other in the processes of identifying giftedness and distributing program enrollments.  In 
particular, I focus on how the distribution of incentives and sanctions across governance 
domains affects educators’ decisions about whether to engage advocates in the 
identification process, which advocates to engage in the identification process, and how 
advocates strategize their actions within this political framework.  In Part I of this 
chapter, I review the relevant literatures. I begin with an overview of the literature on 
context and political participation.  Then I review the literature on political control of the 
bureaucracy and the responsiveness of the bureaucracy to the public.  In Part II, I offer 







application to understanding enrollment patterns in gifted and talented education 
programs. 
Part I.   
 
Context: pushing participation forward, but leaving institutions behind  
 The study of political participation has evolved from focusing purely on 
individuals’ motivation for participating in politics to understanding the impact of the 
contexts in which these individuals mobilize to engage in political activities.  Early 
studies of political mobilization – particularly voting behavior – examined the decision to 
participate in politics as a function of individual resources.  The individual calculus to 
vote was theorized to be based on the availability of free time, political knowledge and 
understanding, the sense of efficacy, education, and income (Rosenstone and Hansen, 
1993; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995; Verba and Nie, 1972).   
 Individuals who know more about politics—politicians, laws, rules or procedures 
– are more likely to participate in politics than are individuals with less knowledge.  This 
trend holds for levels of education and income as well.  But these trends do not hold for 
African Americans who when controlling for income, education, and efficacy are more 
likely to participate in politics than white Americans.  Walton’s (1995) work on the 
‘anomalous’ political behavior of African Americans demonstrated that the greatest 
predictor of African Americans’ political participation was the absence of a legal or 
institutional barrier to political participation.  When African Americans are afforded the 







 A second line of participation research incorporated external factors into the study 
of participation.  Researchers began to measure the impact of mobilization efforts, social 
networks, and neighborhood composition – to name a few factors – on voting, political 
volunteerism, and letter-writing (e.g., Marschall, 2004; Burns, Scholzman and Verba, 
2001; Oliver, 1999; Cohen and Dawson, 1993; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Henig, 
1988; Huckfeldt, 1979).  Platt and Harris (2006) refer to these factors summarily as the 
contexts within which individuals make their participation decisions.  They argue that the 
confluence of economic and political opportunities – threat, conflict, access/allies, and 
networks --present in the political system determines when and how individuals 
participate in politics.   
 The focus of the context literature on structures and factors that fit into the broad 
categories of mobilization, elections, and empowerment leaves unspecified the ways in 
which political institutions, particularly legal and rule structures, affect participation.  In 
doing so, they omit a key explanation for participatory behavior, treating institutional 
power and behavior as distinct and separate entities.  Yet, these concepts are 
interdependent, with the legal structure having a direct and immediate influence on 
participatory behavior and participation having a strong, though perhaps somewhat 
removed and lagged, causal effect on the structure of government (Walton, 1995). 
Institutions: focusing on opportunities without assessing response  
 The context literature pushes the study of participation forward at the expense of 







engages in a comparable practice by developing elaborate theories of opportunity for 
participation but not systematically assessing how the public responds.  
 Political institutions delineate who has agency within a political realm and how 
that agency can be exercised.  These structures dictate which members of the public can 
legitimately make claims on social goods and the ways that they can make these claims.  
They also outline how government agencies and policy implementers can respond to the 
actions of advocacy communities.  Few studies demonstrating a relationship between the 
shape of political institutions and policy outcomes detail how the public’s response to the 
opportunity structure and the exchange between implementers and the participating 
public impacts outcomes, creating a black box in the chain of knowledge about the 
impact of political control on policy outcomes.  The literature as it has so emerged, 
makes policy implementers ‘outcome magicians’ of sorts (that is, if the public does not 
respond to the newly constructed participatory opportunities, for example) or passive yes-
men for the participating public’s agenda (as in, policy outcomes change simply by virtue 
of changes in the advocacy community).  A review of the literature on the impact of 
institutions on policy outcomes and bureaucratic behavior will clarify the elements 
necessary to illuminate the black box. 
 In their discussion of the ability for administrative procedures to serve as political 
controls of the administrative bureaucracy, McCubbins et al (ibid) draw out implications 
for the political behavior of citizen groups. Administrative procedures embodied in laws, 
legislative mandates, and public policies delineate the body of rights and responsibilities 







to goods and services, the basis on which they can make these claims, the timeframes 
within which these claims can be made, and the reasonable outcomes.  These structures 
also dictate who these claims can be made against—individuals, businesses, governments 
– and the circumstances that determine the appropriate entity for the claim.  Moreover, 
these institutions dictate who is responsible for monitoring the settlement of these claims, 
determining appropriate behavior for these monitors, and outlining the mechanisms they 
can use in this task.   
 The McCubbins et al (ibid) synthesis of the political control of bureaucratic 
behavior focuses on the relationship between federal level politicians and executive 
agencies using the principal-agent framework for analysis.  The principal-agent paradigm 
is a useful tool for understanding the relationship between these parties for several 
reasons. First, executive agencies exist as creations of the federal executive, legislative 
and judicial branches. Their composition, lifespan, and tasks are determined by the 
politicians who occupy federal office at any given time.  The politicians are dependent 
upon the agencies to complete specified tasks for which the politicians likely lack 
expertise.  And the agencies, whether securing their existence (Carpenter, 2001; Lupia 
and McCubbins, 1994; Wilson, 1983) or continuing mandates from previous political 
regimes (McCubbins et al, 1987) may have reason to implement the political agendas 
with less vigor than desired.  Thus, the problem of aligning the actions of the bureaucracy 
with the preferences of the political forces emerges. 
 Yet the applicability of the McCubbins et al findings to the relationship between 







communities and local level agencies in general is not straightforward because the 
relationship between the local agency and the federal government is quite different from 
the relationship between the federal executive agencies and the federal government.  The 
primary difference is that these types of  local agencies are not creatures of the federal 
government.  They are creatures of state governments and, if the standard principal-agent 
model were to be applied, the agents of these governments.  Yet they are bound by the 
legal mandates of the federal government and frequently enter into regulatory 
relationships with the federal government voluntarily in exchange for financial support.  
Thus, while the relationship between executive agencies and federal politicians is 
essentially necessary, the relationship between federal politicians and local agencies like 
school districts is fundamentally voluntary, though the tendency of these types of local 
agencies to enter into the relationships demonstrate the strength of the coercive power of 
the federal pocketbook.   
 The relationship of local level agencies to the judiciary branch of the federal 
government is a bit more complex as the federal judiciary can choose to enter into the 
local-level fray to ensure that local regulation of school districts does not interfere with 
the rights and privileges guaranteed at the federal level.  Thus, the federal judiciary 
maintains a constant presence in local governance through which it adjudicates the  
balance of power between individuals and between individuals and governments.  Of 
course, the federal judiciary may opt to not take action but its ability to do so – whether 
its rulings are followed or not – sets its relationship to local agencies like school districts 







 Additionally, the relationships differ because many local agencies interact more 
directly with clients or advocacy group members than do executive agencies.  Brehm and 
Gates (1997) find that social workers – quintessential bureaucrats who work directly with 
clients (i.e., Lipsky’s ‘street-level bureaucrats’(1980)) -- rank their clients as the group of 
actors who have the most influence over how they spend their time at work.  Of 
customers, supervisors, coworkers, and the director, only customers influence whether or 
not the social workers take work home to complete.  A second study reiterates the relative 
importance of client behaviors and orientations on bureaucrats’ conceptions of their jobs.  
Brehm and Gates find that bureaucrats are aware of the changes in the mobilization level 
of the public but unaware of changes in the activity levels of legislators.  This finding 
leads Brehm and Gates to conclude that citizens may receive more efficient responses 
from bureaucrats if they approach them directly rather than voicing their concerns 
through the mediation of elected officials. This difference suggests that understanding 
how members of the local level agency respond on a case-by-case basis to political 
control and citizen/client participation is fundamental to understanding policy outcomes. 
  The relationship between clients and bureaucrats highlights restrictions on the 
concept of expertise modeled within the basic principal-agent framework. In the classic 
model, the agents – executive agencies – operate as the experts in the relationship.  It is 
their expertise in a policy area that fuels the dilemma of asymmetric information and 
necessitates the use of incentives and sanctions to induce compliance.  However, a focus 
on the activities of advocacy communities reminds us that expertise is honed and 







 In particular, politicians must operate with a certain level of  political expertise to 
facilitate their abilities to be responsive to the public.  This political expertise has 
implications for how politicians interact with bureaucrats and bureaucratic agencies.  
Frequently, scholars conflate the agendas of politicians and the public in studies of 
political control of the bureaucracy, using politicians’ agendas to proxy for those of the 
public.  In doing so, they leave untold the story of the politician who strategically 
constructs and enforces regulations of bureaucratic behavior in pursuit of two agendas – 
his own and that of the advocacy community.  This politician’s outcome preferences 
fluctuate with the capacity and capability of the bureaucrat and the policy implementing 
agency. 
 Moreover, a focus on the relationship between clients and bureaucrats reveals that 
bureaucrats must exhibit political savvy as well as policy expertise (Meier and O’Toole, 
2006; Brehm and Gates, 1997; Wamsley, 1990). In his “agency perspective” of public 
administration, Wamsley writes that the ideal bureaucrat serves as an agent for the 
citizens by whom he is employed.  Wamsley conceptualizes this bureaucrat as a Burkean 
guardian and advancer of the public good.  As such, he acts as a “citizen agent standing 
in place of other citizens (principals), exerting power for them and in their stead to 
achieve an end, a collective purpose; but always consciously responsible to them and 
acting by their authority (page 117, emphasis in the original).”  Wamsley’s bureaucrat is 
an active participant in governance -- not simply a referee between citizens and the 








 Exercising political savvy, the bureaucrat is theorized to engage in preemptive 
activity.  Meier and O’Toole (2006) write: 
These [bureaucrats’ own preferences which have the greatest effect on 
performance] can operate beyond the decisions and actions that can 
reasonably be monitored by political overseers and may even enable 
bureaucrats to “respond” in an anticipatory sense to broad public 
preferences without explicit intervention or signaling from politicians. 
 
The anchor for preemptive policy implementation is the set of the bureaucrat’s own 
preferences which are out of the reach of politicians.  The link between preferences and 
the avoidance of political control makes sense if these preferences lack content that can 
be regulated by political overseers.  But if the converse is true – that is if politicians can 
monitor and regulate bureaucrats’ personal preferences, then political control may be 
implicated in the anticipatory response.   
The bureaucrat’s personal preferences: out of the realm of political control? 
 Meier and O’Toole define political control of the bureaucracy as the ability of 
politicians to convince bureaucrats to engage in activities they would not have engaged in 
otherwise. To measure the presence of political control then, they incorporate measures 
of bureaucrats’ preferences into their analyses.  Meier and O’Toole turn to the theory of 
representative bureaucracy to guide their measurement of bureaucrats’ values, using 
educators’ and politicians’ ethnic background as a proxy for their values.  In the analysis 
they present in chapter four, they write:  
No single kind of measure picks up the full preference or effort of 
political actors to try to achieve an outcome like improved Latino 
educational performance, but ethnicity itself … While these 
measures [more traditional ones like interest group scores, partisan 
percentages or budgetary shifts]  are not necessarily flawed ways 







nor empirically superior to ethnicity as a proxy for values.  This 
point holds in particular when the outcomes being examined 
directly affect clients of the same ethnicity, as they do in this study 
(p. 76).   
 
By using ethnicity as a proxy for preferences, Meier and O’Toole presume that school 
board members and educators prioritize their ethnic agendas over their professional goals.  
They base their decision to do so on the empirical literature on representative 
bureaucracy (e.g., Hindera, 1993; Meier and Stewart, 1991; Meier, Stewart, and England; 
1989).   
 Yet even these studies do not assess the causal mechanisms for the correlations 
they find between racial representation and policy outcomes.  For example, Meier et al 
(1989) find that educational outcomes for black students are positively correlated with the 
number of black representatives on the school board and the number of black educators in 
the school district.  They conclude that the shared values of black bureaucrats, black 
politicians, and the black community are responsible for the empirical patterns. However, 
black educators could be better facilitators of achievement for black students because 
they subscribe to a certain educational philosophy (i.e., professional norm) that when 
followed by educators of other races produces the same results.  Or it could be the case 
that black educators engage in special efforts to produce achievement for black students 
because of their shared backgrounds.  In either case, these studies do not test for the 
causal explanation.   
 In contrast, Coleman et al (1998) offers some causal insight, finding that the 
transition from passive to active representation by minority administrators (that is, 







group) is increased by the extent to which the bureaucrat adopts a minority representative 
role. The adoption of the minority representative role is positively correlated with (a) 
being a minority, (b) having the perception that increasing minority access to public 
goods is a job expectation, and (c) having  the perception that it is one’s job both to 
increase minority access to public goods and implement programs according to 
department policy.  Notably, the magnitude of the impact of race on adopting the 
minority representative role is equal to and only slightly larger than the two measures of 
job expectations – standardized coefficients were 0.32, 0.24, and 0.32, respectively – 
meaning that the bureaucrats’ sense of professionalism is at least an equally powerful 
contributor to job performance as is race.  
 Moreover, adopting the minority representative perspective is negatively 
correlated with the bureaucrat’s level of education, his connection to the organization 
(number of years in the organization, extent of training, years in current position) and 
having a traditional orientation towards the function of the bureaucracy (i.e., perceiving 
one’s role as the efficient implementation of the organization’s programs and policies).  
The standardized coefficient for this variable was -0.31, suggesting again that 
professional norms are just as strong as racial identity in the bureaucrat’s determination 
of how to implement programs.   
 In their analysis of the activities of police officers, Brehm and Gates (1993) 
examine the factors associated with whether bureaucratic agents choose to engage in 
working (pursuing the principal’s agenda), shirking (intentionally offering a subpar 







principal’s agenda).  They find that bureaucratic behavior is most strongly predicted by a 
bureaucrat’s level of professionalism (as measured by an external evaluator familiar with 
the norms, practices, and organizational culture of the police department), then by 
positive feelings of solidarity with other workers, appreciation and enjoyment of their 
functional duties, and finally the incentives and sanctions offered by supervisors.  Brehm 
and Gates note the importance of institutions like the police academy for reinforcing the 
notion of professionalism.   
 Pointedly, Meier and O’Toole’s (ibid) analysis of shirking in chapter five 
highlights the importance of professionalism in the bureaucrat’s decision to shirk.  In this 
chapter, Meier and O’Toole define cheating as shirking and they argue that bureaucrats 
are likely to cheat when they (a) face severe problems; (b) have few resources to invest in 
compliance, (c) have low transaction costs to coordinate the cheating activity; and (d) are 
highly educated and have the capacity to effectively accomplish the cheat.  In sum, 
bureaucrats cheat to protect their organizations from failure when they have the capacity 
to do so. This finding points us once again to the conclusion that the bureaucrats’ sense of 
his profession drives his job performance.  Yet, the finding is ironic because the 
educators are willing to abandon the goal of the profession – to educate students – in the 
effort to preserve the institution.  Thus, at the heart of their professionalism, these 
educators are engaging in professional protectionism (Carpenter, 2001; Lupia and 
McCubbins, 1994; Wilson, 1983).   
 The empirical research points to three characteristics of the bureaucrat’s 







bureaucrat’s preferences.  (2) Bureaucrats may prioritize protection of the profession or 
bureau over accomplishing its core mission.  (3) Professionalism is more important to the 
bureaucrat than the incentives and sanctions offered by a supervisor or a political 
overseer. Thus, under particular conditions, regulating the bureaucrat’s need to engage in 
protectionist activities would be an effective source of political control. 
Part II. 
 
Proprietary threat: the political regulation of anticipatory response. 
 Meier and O’Toole’s (ibid) anticipatory response occurs at the interface of the 
policy implementer and the public.  They conceptualize it as preemptive action 
implementing the preferences of the broad public which goes unmediated by the political 
overseer.  Anticipatory response implies bureaucrats’ knowledge of the public’s 
preferences, discretion to make decisions, and savvy to arbitrate between competing 
preferences.   
 Though contradictory to Meier and O’Toole’s explication,  this conceptualization 
of anticipatory response also implies the alignment of the public’s preferences with the 
preferences of those who oversee the bureaucracy. If the policies were not in alignment 
with the preferences of overseers, enacting them would result in negative reactions from 
the overseer.  Rather than presuming that the preferences of politicians and the public are 
always the same, the alignment between politicians and the public highlights a point of 







response also occurs at the interface of the bureaucrat and the political overseer, making 
the policy implementer- public interaction subject to the control of the political overseer.3
 Figure 2.1 summarizes a primary set of relationships between politicians, policy 
implementers and constituent-advocates in the production of policy outcomes.  
Politicians create or uphold the rules of political engagement.  They alter policy outcomes 
through their decisions to respond to, ignore, or suppress public advocacy.  Politicians 
alter policy outcomes through policy implementers by setting outcome targets, 
distributing incentives and sanctions, and structuring procedures.  Finally, politicians 
influence policy outcomes by moderating the relationships between policy implementers 
and constituent advocates. 
 


































                                                 
3 This understanding of the bureaucrat’s  preemptive exchange with the public is closer to the “law of 







 I articulate the theory of proprietary threat to clarify the relationship between 
bureaucrats, political overseers and the public in the areas of government where 
bureaucratic agents are poised to provide the most immediate response to the public.  The 
theory of proprietary threat elaborates on the policy implementer’s decision-making 
process when facing competing claims for public goods within environments with 
various power-sharing arrangements between national, state, and local governments. The 
theory posits (1) that policy implementers who want to maintain their status as the 
primary experts in their fields will be preemptive in policy implementation when clients 
or members of the public are likely to engage in activities that copy and compete with 
their services and (2) that their calculation of when such a threat is present can be altered 
through the distribution of incentives and sanctions by political overseers. 
 The theory of proprietary threat posits that policy implementers who want to 
maintain the professional integrity of their institutions will be preemptive in policy 
implementation when facing the potential scrutiny of external actors whose involvement 
implicitly sanctions their performance.  The ultimate sanction facing a policy 
implementer is the termination of its contract or the reconstitution of its agency.4
                                                 
4 Reconstituting a public service agency consists of overhauling its staff or leadership or altering its 
purposes.  This is the equivalent of dismantling a private sector firm. 
  
Proprietary threat confers an intermediary sanction on the policy implementer: the loss of 
institutional prestige.  It refers to the external actor’s direct involvement in the 
implementer’s realm of governance, its co-performance of the implementer’s tasks.  The 
agency remains in tact and the implementer’s services are retained, but the implementer’s 







compromised.  Thus, the function of the sanction in the proprietary threat hypothesis is to 
induce protection of institutional prestige, i.e. professional protectionism .   
 Proprietary threat emerges in fields where many qualifications must be met in 
order to attain employment.  Prerequisites like education, certification, field training, and 
licensing restrict access to the fields and draw a distinction between professionals and 
laypersons.  Professionals work to maintain the integrity of their professions by 
controlling admission into the profession, the activities or methods of the professional, 
and the outputs.  Laypersons co-performing professional tasks or dictating job 
performance threaten the purity of the profession and its outputs.  When professionals 
must meet performance criteria that do not have a foundation in the profession, then the 
integrity of the profession is compromised.  Resentment among professionals for 
laypersons engaging in these types of activities increases with the number of prerequisites 
required for professional status.   
 Proprietary threat can be induced by any of the external actors who can credibly 
threaten to terminate the implementer’s contract or reconstitute the agency.  Proprietary 
threat can originate from individual citizens who have the ability to opt out of public 
services or who can levy their connections with political leaders to induce responsiveness 
and it can originate from citizens who have been empowered by the governing institution 
to monitor policy implementers.  In the latter case, proprietary threat functions as a part 
of the ex-post monitoring system in the principal-agent relationship between policy 
implementers and the governing bodies that regulate them.  Ex-post monitoring refers to 







lacks the resources to monitor the agent directly.  The monitor has the ability to sanction 
the agent for suboptimal performance at a level that is subsidized by the governing 
principal, which may include the ability to fire the agent or reconstitute the agency (Aoki, 
1994).  Whether proprietary threat is invoked through personals resources or is 
government subsidized as a part of the ex-post monitoring system, the strength of the 
proprietary threat is determined by the third party’s ability to fire the agent or reconstitute 
the agency and shapes how the policy implementer will respond.   
 ‘Proprietary threat response’ is the preemptive and strategic implementation of 
policy to avoid intervention from constituents by biasing policy outcomes in their favor.  
Proprietary threat response refers to the tendency of policy implementers to align policy 
outcomes with the desires of the constituents whom they anticipate will become actively 
engaged in the determination of policy outcomes.  While policy implementers appreciate 
the involvement of constituents in supporting the activities of their institutions, they are 
wary of constituents who desire to redirect the energies of the institutions (e.g., 
Rosentraub and Warren, 1987).  Implementers appreciate helpers but they resent 
constituents who intervene to alter the established goals of the institution.   
 Interactions with intervening constituents are costly to policy implementers for 
two reasons.  First, interventions require responsiveness, especially when they come from 
constituents who can sanction the institution for non-response.  And importantly, 







the realm of decision-making that is in the sole discretion of the policy implementer.5
 Proprietary threat response is triggered when the presumed costs of interacting 
with a service recipient are too high.  The costs of interaction are calculated on two 
dimensions: (1) the likelihood that the recipient will engage in intervention activities and 
(2) the credibility of the recipient’s threat to sanction the institution if the implementer 
does not respond satisfactorily to intervention.  The sanction may come in several forms: 
the service recipient opting out of services, thereby reducing agency income; pressure 
from a political leader to whom the implementer must be responsive; pressure from an 
advocacy group that cannot be ignored because it is persistent or loud or because doing 
so would result in unfavorable actions, etc.   Because there is no real penalty for non-
response when recipients who cannot sanction the institution for non-response intervene,  
proprietary threat response results in policy outcomes that reflect the preferences of 
service recipients in this order: (1) credible interveners; (2) credible non-interveners; (3) 
non-credible interveners; and (4) non-credible non-interveners.  Figure 2.2 provides a 
visual depiction of these relationships. 
  
Thus policy implementers, wary of constituent encroachment on their exclusive duties, 
preemptively implement policies to appease potential intervening constituents.  While 
these constituents are obviously influencing policy, implementers are able to claim the 
policy innovations as their own rather than appeasements to constituents.  They are able 
to provide responsive service without attributing any of the innovation and planning to 
intervening constituents. 
                                                 
5 Bureaucrats try to maximize autonomy in the realms in which they have sole influence.  See for example, 
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non-interveners 
(Cost of non-response) 
 
 
 Proprietary threat response is induced by credible threats to sanction policy 
institutions through direct involvement in the affairs of the institution.  The credibility of 
a threat relies on the actual potential of the intervening party to terminate the service 
contract between the service recipient and the service provider.  When service providers 
believe that a credible threat is imminent, they preemptively act, distributing preferred 
services to the source of the threat.  Implementers gauge the credibility of a threat by 
estimating the service recipient’s ability to change service markets, the recipient’s ability 
to reconstitute the agency, the ability to level political resources, and if the recipient has 
been empowered as a monitor by the governing principal, whether the recipient will act 
in this capacity.   
 Implementers use readily available cues like perceived socioeconomic status and 
race to determine a service recipient’s ability to change service markets.  Financial 







policy where public service markets are highly determined by geographic location, 
financial resources signal the ability to relocate into a different public service market 
(e.g., move into a different school district) or to exit the public school market for the 
private school market.  Exit from the school district results in the loss of revenue – either 
from taxes or from federal funds distributed based on the enrollment of children from 
low-income families.   
 Race is also a highly effective gauge of the ability to change service markets, 
especially for African Americans.  Blackness historically has been and continues to be a 
prohibitive factor in housing mobility (e.g., Massey and Denton, 1993; Yinger, 1986).  
Moreover, race – particularly being African American – signals the extent to which 
political leaders will be willing to use their political influence to restructure the agency to 
the benefit of African Americans’ preferences.  Thus, without being empowered as 
monitors the credibility of threats from African Americans is ranked as rather small.6
 When the governing principal empowers a class of citizens as monitors, it makes 
members of the class empowered political agents by assuming a level of political liability 
for the attainment of their preferences.  As a result, the credibility of the members of that 
class increases tremendously.  The impact of empowering a class of individuals can have 
the effect of incorporating a previously disenfranchised group into the policy-making 
realm.  It signals that access in that policy-making realm now has a group-based 
dimension thereby legitimizing group-based claims to services and conveys that political 
mechanisms may be used in pursuit of the groups’ goals.  Implementers gauge the 
   
                                                 
6 Individuals, groups, and classes are empowered as policy monitors when they are identified in legislation 







credibility of threat from members of empowered classes by estimating the strength of 
the governing principal’s commitment to the class and the extent to which the members 
of the class are likely to serve as liaisons between the class, the service agency, and 
political leaders.  One way that implementers assess this possibility is the level of 
political engagement of the members.  In the realm of education policy, where race, 
housing, and service markets overlap, an effective cue for implementers is the level of 
political engagement in a neighborhood. 
 In sum, the policy implementer’s professional protectionism provides a 
mechanism for political control.  A governing principal that subsidizes the monitoring 
activities of a third party can provoke policy implementers to produce policy outcomes 
that align with their preferences.  The likelihood of the preemptive action on behalf of the 
subsidized monitor depends on the size of the subsidy (i.e., the level of incentives and 
sanctions the principal will distribute for engagement with the third party and the extent 
to which the principal will follow up with the agent based on the monitor’s claims).  
Thus,  the governing principal may be able to  provoke policy implementers to respond to 
subsidized monitors in the same manner that they respond to individuals who 
independently have the ability to opt out of public services.  
 The theory of proprietary threat diverges from other theories of bureaucratic 
behavior in several ways.  The first and most critical innovation of the theory of 
proprietary threat is that it operates from the premise that bureaucrats interact 
preemptively with service recipients.  Bureaucrats frequently are characterized as actors 







prevent sanction and to promote bureaucratic autonomy (Carpenter, 2001; Lupia and 
McCubbins, 1994; Wilson, 1983).  Yet, with a few exceptions (e.g., Lipsky, 1980) 
bureaucrats’ interactions with service recipients are characterized as straightforward 
responses to constituents’ expressed preferences or needs (e.g., Jones-Correa, 2008; 
Meier and O’Toole, 2006; Meier, 1999; Brehm and Gates, 1997; Meier et al, 1993).  
Bureaucratic interactions with constituents may be filtered through the culture and norms 
of the agency (Jones-Correa, 2008; Meier and O’Toole, 2006; Lin, 2000) or through 
bureaucrats’ value orientations (Meier, 1999; Coleman, Brudney, and Kellough, 1998; 
Meier et al, 1993; Meier and England, 1984), but they do not reflect the needs and self-
oriented preferences of bureaucrats.  
 The premise of asymmetrically strategic bureaucrats (that is strategic with respect 
to principals, but not strategic with respect to clients) has two implications.  First, 
bureaucrats have little incentive to be responsive to constituents with whom they do not 
share the same preference orientations.  Secondly, the reach of political principals is 
restricted from the bureaucrat-constituent relationship.  When this happens, the influence 
of political institutions on the relationship between bureaucrats and advocacy goes 
unspecified.  The theory of proprietary threat characterizes bureaucrats as self-interested 
strategists who may rank their interests higher than those of their clients.  This premise 
allows for the manipulation of these interests by political principals through institutional 
control.   
 The second innovation of the theory of proprietary threat is that the characteristics 







to base their decisions about the distribution of tangible goods; they use shortcuts to 
determine service provision.  This is a unique use of shortcuts because it is not based on 
interactions with service recipients that may belie their preferences for service; rather, it 
is based on perceptions of the preferences of categories of people.  The proprietary threat 
hypothesis turns demand side characteristics into supply characteristics.  That is, it argues 
that social characteristics that are generally used to explain service recipient behavior are 
actually relevant because they explain bureaucratic behavior.  The use of service recipient 
characteristics as a shortcut divorces the automatic link between individual social 
position and behavior while explaining their conjoint impact on policy outcomes. 
 The theory of proprietary threat is also innovative in that it theorizes a 
relationship between policy implementers and service recipients that parallels the 
relationship between elected officials and citizens in intensity, sensitivity, and 
receptiveness.  The theory of proprietary threat distinguishes between the incentives of an 
electorally-grounded relationship and a professionally-grounded relationship and 
demonstrates the interdependence of these two types of relationships for the distribution 
of public goods.  In elaborating on these parallel and codependent relationships, it 
theorizes an additional mechanism of democratic governance. 
   Finally, the theory of proprietary threat is unique in that bureaucratic action is 
taken to preserve prestige, not position.  Policy implementers take this preemptive step to 
avoid encroachment on their ideological and professional territory.  The penalty for not 
acting preemptively or for miscalculating the participatory nature of a service recipient is 







 In addition to its distinctive conception of bureaucratic behavior, the theory of 
proprietary threat presumes a distinctive conception of threat.  Two of the most prevalent 
discussions of threat in the social science literature are racial threat and competition-
based threat.  In these conceptions of threat, individuals feel jeopardized by the idea or 
reality that resources will no longer be available to them because they will be attained by 
‘the other’  (Sears, Sidanius, and Bobo, 2000; Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Blumer, 1958).  
Racial threat and competition-based threat differ from proprietary threat in that the 
former types of threat assume that members of the competing groups are categorical 
equivalents who are competing for the same resource whereas proprietary threat occurs in 
situations where different (though linked) resources are pursued by people with  
asymmetric status.   
 A central premise of the theory of proprietary threat is that the persons 
experiencing and generating threat are not categorical equivalents as one is a service 
provider and the other is a service recipient.  The reward for prevailing in the conflict for 
the service provider is the preservation of proprietary integrity in the institution.  The 
reward for prevailing in the conflict for the service recipient is access to the public 
resource.  The asymmetry in status between service provider and service recipient, absent 
the intervention of governing overseers, generates a dynamic between these actors that is 
absent from race-based and competition-based theories of threat in two ways.  First, the 
agent has been enlisted based on her expertise to provide a service that the service 
recipient cannot provide herself.  Thus the policy implementer exerts informational 







democracy, the service recipient has the power to terminate the services of the policy 
implementer.  The recipient can transfer into the jurisdiction of different policy 
implementers.  The consequences of these distinctions are critical to the manner in which 
policy implementers interact with the public as was discussed above. 
 The implications of the theory of proprietary threat are as follows.  (1) Policy 
outcomes vary with the level of threat credibility attributed to constituents by policy 
implementers rather than objective criteria relevant to service provision.   
That is, characteristics like perceived socioeconomic status, race, and political power 
guide resource distribution at the expense of need and qualification.  (2) Policy outcomes 
vary with the kinds of relationships between policy implementers and service recipients 
that are written into legislation. (3) Policy outcomes vary with the extent to which the 
government subsidizes the political activities of the constituent-service recipient.  The 
extent of subsidy is conveyed by the level to which the government incentivizes and 
sanctions the implementers’ distributional outputs.  When a group is fully politically 
incorporated, policy outcomes will not vary by membership in that group, but will vary 
by threat credibility.  The extent to which group membership is not a factor in the 
distribution of policy goods is conditional on the level at which the government 
subsidizes the incorporation of the group. (4) Policy outcome distributions will be 
skewed toward group members who are likely to serve as liaisons between the group, 
policy implementers and political leaders and away from group members who are not 







legislation based on their own capacity for political culpability and the capacity of 
implementers for implementation.  
Studying the archetypical case: gifted and talented education 
 Why hasn’t black community participation in the education process produced 
equity in educational opportunities and outcomes?  Despite advocacy to improve and 
equalize black educational opportunities and outcomes spanning multiple centuries, black 
student access to high quality educational opportunities and achievement in educational 
programs lags behind that of white students (e.g., Lewis, 2008; Danns, 2003; Anderson, 
1988; McCaul, 1987).  As with many other measures of educational achievement, black 
students fall behind in enrollments in gifted and talented education programs as compared 
to their white classmates.  Parent participation in education has become a widely touted 
policy mechanism for increasing the enrollment of black students in gifted and talented 
education programs as well as for improving general educational outcomes for black 
students (Donovan and Cross, 2002; Ford, 1996; Oakes, 1986).   
 While many policy recommendations advance the participatory strategy for 
increasing enrollment, few acknowledge that the various forms of parent participation 
style can strongly influence educator response to parents and educational outcomes.7
                                                 
7 I use the terms educators and administrators interchangeably to refer to teachers, principals, and other 
administrators at the school-district level.  
  
Indeed, most policy recommendations assume a coproductive relationship between 
parents, communities, and schools, while descriptions of the activities that are successful 
at maximizing student outcomes (particularly access to the most competitive education 







(Rothstein, 2004; Danns, 2003; Crozier, 2000; Limage, 2000; Henig et al, 1999; 
Cullingford, 1996; Ford, 1996; Vincent, 1996; Lareau, 1989; Williams, 1989; Lewis, 
1985; Lightfoot, 1978).  I argue that presuming a coproductive relationship between 
parents, communities, and schools prohibits the ability to create effective levers in 
education policy which promotes persistence of the educational gaps.  In this dissertation, 
I apply the theory of proprietary threat to gifted and talented education to explain the 
antagonisms in the parents-communities-schools relationship and its impact on black 
student enrollment rates in gifted and talented education programs with an eye for 
enhancing understanding of the dynamics driving the broader educational achievement 
gap. 
 I explicate the theory of proprietary threat through the lens of gifted and talented 
education programs for several reasons.  First, gifted education is one of the least 
standardized areas of public education (Donovan and Cross, 2002) which means that 
educators have the freedom to exercise a lot of discretion for identifying students and 
distributing enrollments.  A broad spectrum of identification standards, curriculum, and 
funding exists within and across states.  The movement to provide consistent 
programming within states is recent and is in most places is in the process of being 
implemented.8
                                                 
8While a central goal of the National Research Center for the Education of Gifted Children and Youth is to 
assist in developing consistent rules and regulations for programs across the states, its progress towards this 
goal is reflected in the NCLB specification of program enrollment as a measure of adequate yearly 
progress.  This contrasts strongly with most other annual yearly progress indicators which focus on student 
outcomes.   
  The contested nature of gifted identification also makes it a fertile place 
to explore proprietary threat response.  All U.S. states allow for the identification of 







presumed subjectivity of teacher recommendation as well as other identification criteria 
like portfolio analysis, along with the various interpretations of intelligence tests, leaves 
much room for public discourse about who should be enrolled in the programs.  At the 
same time, gifted program instructors and intelligence test administrators receive 
specialized training for their positions.  The added level of professional training required 
for gifted instructors and intelligence testers heightens the proprietary nature of gifted 
identification and should intensify the perception of threat when the public intervenes 
(Beatty et al, 2006; Margolin, 1994; Sapon-Shevin, 1994).   
 Finally, the nature of advocacy in education makes education an optimal site for 
explicating the theory of proprietary threat.  Education is generally considered a 
constituent-based policy arena rather than an advocacy-based one.  This means that the 
efforts of one individual -- like a parent -- are generally sufficient to produce results and 
thus, theoretically, the minimum size necessary for an advocacy community to be 
effective is one.  The small effective advocacy community size minimizes the complexity 
of modeling the relationship between the advocacy community and agency response.  
Moreover, education historically has been a policy arena for which advocacy is sustained 
even in the face of agency non-response.9
 Racial disparity in GATE enrollment no doubt contributes to the broader 
‘achievement gap’ between minority and non-minority children (Darity and Jolla, 2010; 
  These characteristics of education help to 
isolate the direct and indirect effects of restructuring agency response on policy 
outcomes.   
                                                 







Hubbard and Mehan, 1999).  First, gifted enrollment is legislated as a measurement that 
can be used to assess the average yearly progress of school districts toward minimizing 
the gaps in achievement between white and non-white and between higher and lower 
income students.  More importantly, enrollment in gifted and talented education 
programs has a cumulative effect that widens the gulf between the academic skills of 
enrollees and non-enrollees.  In addition to the academic gains from the earlier pacing of 
critical thinking skills in gifted classrooms (including learning how to be smart), 
participants benefit from increased confidence associated with being categorized as 
‘gifted.’  This results in increased capacity to enroll in more difficult courses later in 
schooling (Darity and Jolla, 2010).  While much attention has been dedicated to 
understanding the causes and consequences of disparity in basic achievement between 
minority and non-minority students (graduation rates, standardized test scores, etc.) 
relatively little attention has been dedicated to understanding the persistence of disparate 
outcomes for minority and non-minority students at the upper end of the academic 
spectrum (e.g., enrollment and performance in gifted and talented education programs 
and AP courses).  Establishing the existence of proprietary threat response and its impact 
on GATE enrollment illuminates the role that proprietary threat response plays for 
inducing accountability in other areas of education.  
 The theory of proprietary threat is predicated on the idea that the ability of white 
and white middle-class parents to vote with their feet creates a credible threat to 







preferences (Lowery, 1998; Hirschman, 1970).10
 At the same time, educators’ assessment of threat credibility from African 
American parents primarily rests on the level of political empowerment of African 
Americans because of the relative immobility of African Americans and the well-known 
prevalence of relatively poor education offerings for African American students (which 
suppresses the idea that moving to a different district will actually result in better 
outcomes).  The political empowerment of African Americans conveys African 
Americans’ ability to levy connections with officials who can pressure educators into 
offering the opportunities and services that they prefer.  When political structures 
incorporate African Americans into the education process, they institutionalize the idea 
that political officials can be held accountable for the attainment of African American 
education preferences -- to the extent that this is electorally feasible – and the possibility 
that politicians will use their influence with educators to secure the preferences of the 
African American community.  
  To avoid the sanction of exit and the 
proprietary encroachment that comes with intervention activities, educators will satisfy 
the implicit requests of mobile parents: placing their children in upper level classes, 
assigning them to the best teachers, and making the best schools available to them.   
 In the absence of political structures that incorporate African Americans or in the 
presence of political structures that disempower African Americans, African Americans 
are assessed as non-credible interveners.  When African Americans are assessed as non-
                                                 
10 The theory of proprietary threat owes much to Hirschman’s discussion of credible threat in Exit, Voice, 
and Loyalty.  While providing a rich conceptual tool, Hirschman’s discussion was not oriented toward 
empirical analysis, i.e. there were no mechanisms for prediction.  The theory of  proprietary threat lends 







credible interveners, educators are more willing to risk sanction from African American 
parents than white parents.  They therefore rank the preferences of African American 
parents lower than those of white parents, resulting in the distribution of educational 
goods like upper level placements and assignment to the best teachers and schools to 
white students instead of African American students. 
 As it relates to gifted education, proprietary threat response refers to heavily 
weighting an estimate of parent intervention to determine GATE placement.  For students 
whose whiteness associates them with residential mobility, this proxy is presumed socio-
economic status.  In places where the accountability regimes politically incorporate a 
class of parents by deputizing them as policy monitors through the adoption of 
participatory clauses, the proxy in use is the strength of political organization associated 
with that student.   
 Given the history of African American exclusion from political life in general and 
resistance to African American involvement in public education, the use of proprietary 
threat to distribute academic resources explains how there could be such high levels of 
community activism for equal access to academic opportunities and such low rates of 
enrollment.  It also speaks to the legislative strategy of incorporating parent and 
community participation in the identification process as a method of addressing disparity.  
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Setting the Agenda: A Legislative Foundation for Proprietary Threat 
 
 Studies of GATE enrollment patterns tend to examine enrollment in one of three 
ways: (1) at the child level, where it is considered a function students’ personal and 
familial backgrounds; (2) at the local governance level where it is conceptualized as a 
function of local level policy design and implementation (with a particular focus on the 
representative nature of the bureaucracy); or (3) at the state level, where policy design 
and implementation are studied as resultant from the efforts of exceptional legislators, 
interest groups, and researchers.  These studies have ignored the racial politics 
surrounding GATE placement even as the shape and trajectory of GATE programming in 
a particular district has greatly depended on popular attitudes about race and the extent to 
which policies that reflect these attitudes have been enacted.11
 State-level analyses that ignore the impact of racial politics on GATE enrollment 
fail to theorize the political functions of institutional designs (e.g., state and federal 
governance can create incentives and penalties for racially restrictive policies at the 
district-level).  This chapter recasts the state-level analysis, specifying the political 
functions of institutional designs and how they augment or abate disparate enrollment 
patterns.  Making its contribution by focusing on the monitoring mechanisms detailed in 
   
                                                 
11 GATE historically has been used as one way to moderate the levels of racial segregation in schools.  It 
has been used to facilitate compliance with Brown by attracting and retaining upper- and middle-class 
white students in school districts with substantial minority populations.  It also has been used to create 
white classrooms within ‘desegregated’ schools, thereby subverting integration.  See Patterson, James T. 








state legislation, it asserts that state-level management of the bureaucracy is just as 
important for producing desired policy outcomes as are the programs adapted and the 
characteristics of program implementers.  This advances the thesis that states, through 
their regulation of local school districts, structure the politiscapes12 in which parents may 
mobilize for change in education policies and that in doing so, they expand or constrict 
the set of plausible policy outcomes.13
Incorporating legislative constraint into analyses of GATE disparity 
  It thereby illuminates the importance of 
understanding intergovernmental systems of regulation in education policy and the 
importance of accounting for the dynamics of racial politics within these systems.   
 An extensive literature searching for the source of disadvantaged student under-
participation in gifted and talented education programs exists in the fields of political 
science, public administration, and education.  While some of these studies control or 
search for state-level correlates of enrollment, none of them treats the state as an active 
participant in the production of policy outcomes.  The major findings are that (a) minority 
students are enrolled in GATE at higher rates in school districts employing greater 
numbers of minority administrators, teachers, and staff than in school districts with fewer 
minority employees; (b) minority student enrollment is higher in places with certain state 
policy guidelines; and (c) parental requests are effective in ensuring the enrollment of 
                                                 
12 The politiscape is the dynamic space comprised of political potentials; an endogenous space where public 
opinion is forged in light of the unfolding political context.  Conceptually, it is the mapping of potential 
behavioral and attitudinal responses to policy adoption onto potential alternative policy institutions/designs.  
For a fuller explanation, see Wright, Dominick’. "Endogenous Preference Formation Theory: Politiscapes, 
Perceptions & Converging Desires."  Working paper, available by e-mail request: dewright@umich.edu.  
13 The monitoring relationships that states create between themselves and school districts simultaneously 
structure how parents may participate in the gifted identification process and the way that giftedness is 
popularly defined.  This, in turn, affects how members of the public respond to the school district’s 







middle-class white students in upper level classes to which they initially are not selected 
for placement (Oakes, 1985; Welner and Oakes, 2000).   
 Studies grounded in the political science literature find that minority students are 
enrolled in GATE at higher levels when they are descriptively represented in the 
educational bureaucracy than when they are not so represented (Meier, Stewart, and 
England, 1989).  African American students are enrolled in GATE programs at higher 
rates in school districts where greater numbers of African Americans are members of the 
teaching staff and members of the school board than in districts where fewer blacks are 
employed.  This relationship holds for Latino students in school districts with increasing 
numbers of black employees and is even stronger for Latino students in school districts 
with increasing numbers of Latino employees (Meier, 2003; Polinard and Wrinkle, 1990).  
The assumed link between these enrollment rates and diversity in the bureaucracy is that 
minority teachers and administrators have interests congruent with those of minority 
parents and students and use their positions of power to enroll higher numbers of 
minority students.  Yet studies in the field of education demonstrate that the interests of 
minority bureaucrats and minority parents frequently diverge, suggesting the existence of 
an alternative source of higher minority enrollment rates when the bureaucracy is diverse 
(Fairclough, 2004; Brown, 2005; Darity, 2007).14
 Another correlate of higher enrollment rates for underserved students is program 
guidelines.  A study of three states with progressive policies toward the identification of 
 
                                                 
14 These studies suggest that minority bureaucrats use the same types of actions to secure their jobs or 
positions of power as do non-minority bureaucrats.  In the specific, they tend to reward only mainstream 
demonstrations of intelligence and to make placement decisions they believe to be acceptable to parents 







students from traditionally underserved populations distinguishes thirteen key factors that 
are influential for the adaptation and implementation of these policies (Gallagher and 
Coleman, 1994; Foster, Gallagher, and Coleman, 1994).  In the policy development 
phase, strong professional and outside leadership, positive informal relationships among 
members of the leadership pool, healthy state economies, and the presence of flexible 
rules within a set of clearly stated guidelines are important.  Several factors -- 
coordination between leaders of the state and local governments and citizen advocates, a 
bureaucratic structure that facilitates state-wide communication and resource sharing, the 
use of demonstration projects, availability of seed money, the nature of district plans, and 
court action on desegregation cases – exert overwhelming influence on the 
implementation of the policies.  These studies of state policies understand them as 
resultant from the political process on one hand, and the backdrop for local administrative 
action on the other.  Research has also explored the impact of specific identification 
procedures, student motivation, and funding practices on the enrollment rates of 
underserved students (Ford, 1996; O’Connor, 2001; Willis, 1997; Fordham and Ogbu, 
1986; Kunjufu, 1988; Riehl, 2001; Oakes, 1982).  
 Each specification of the role of the state in prior research reflects the traditional 
conception of education policies: education is a creature of the local government.  Yet, 
with the rise of a political environment in which the national government holds states 
responsible for educational outcomes, it becomes increasingly important to understand 
the dynamics of this intermediary position.  The analysis in this chapter examines the 







produce the desired outcomes, focusing on how they oversee the services provided by 
localities and how they position themselves with regard to the resulting outputs.  
 Three conceptions of policy implementation are useful for highlighting the 
relationships detailed in gifted and talented education legislation: the principal-agent 
model, street-level bureaucracy, and isomorphism.  Because each of these concepts 
specifies the dynamics of organizational relationships at different levels, they are 
synthesized to build an explicitly intergovernmental understanding of GATE 
participation rather than juxtaposed as competitive sources of explanation.  This analysis 
works at the intersection of several literatures – governance and implementation, 
bureaucratic representation, and education policy -- which are related and implicitly 
acknowledge each other but are not synthesized to create an understanding of the policy 
environment.  The methodology used, grounded theory, allows exploration of the 
possibilities that (1) the essence of federalism – delegation and monitoring – is a 
controlling factor in GATE governance and (2) the monitoring relationships of interest 
fall outside the boundaries predicated by the literatures.15
 The principal-agent theory of implementation elucidates the dynamic between the 
boss and the worker or between higher and lower levels of an organization (Moe, 1984).  
    
                                                 
15 Using the three conceptions of implementation is not the most straightforward way to examine gifted and 
talented legislation.  As you will see, the results of this analysis place GATE legislation in the center of the 
literatures on delegation and implementation.  I leave this analysis as it is because doing reflects the 
research methodology employed.  Use of the grounded theory methodology was critical for leaving open 
the possibility that GATE governance does not fit within the already established delegation frameworks.  
More importantly, the questions generated by the paradigms used to create the legislative framework 
generated for use in this analysis are critical to the further development of the overall theory developed in 
this dissertation.  For example, the many lingering questions that emerge from using the principal-agent 
theory (e.g., are parents really principals,) set the ground for enveloping their implications into the larger 








The analysis in this chapter casts parents as principals and states as agents who are 
delegated the task of educating children at the appropriate levels.16
 The isomorphism concept provides analytic leverage at the industry level 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991).  It refers to the process through which organizations with 
the same professional goals and bound by the same norms adopt the same policies or 
organizational strategies.  Isomorphism also occurs as organizations look for ways to 
  In essence parents 
can choose to hire the state or a private agency to provide an education for their children.  
A portion of the state-agent task is to identify qualified students for gifted and talented 
programs.  Because the state has more specialized knowledge than the average parent in 
this arena, it essentially is able to define its task and determine the standards of 
performance.  It is also able, through its legislative power, to adjust the amount of 
influence the parent has in the identification process even though the parent officially is 
the principal.  Parents are able to sanction state governance by relocating to districts 
within a state or to different states, thereby reducing the funding distributed to the state or 
its districts for per pupil expenditures.  The state delegates some of its tasks to agencies 
and organizations, becoming the principal to lower-level agents.  These tasks are 
sometimes delegated to organizations ruled by bodies of professional ethics and 
sometimes delegated to organizations resembling street-level bureaucracies.    
                                                 
16 A vast amount of complexity exists in the relationships governing education.  While parents can hire the 
state to educate their children, they are also required by the state to provide some type of education for their 
children.  In addition, the state is accountable to the federal government for the education it provides to 
parents and its overall relationship with parents.  Furthermore, the sub-agent relationship between the state 
and school districts is complicated by the very real and distinct relationships between parents and the 
school districts as well as the federal governments and school districts.  The larger task of this dissertation 
is to gain leverage on how these relationships are intertwined and how they are co-regulatory.  Specifying 
parents as principals and states as agents at this stage of the project allows me to delineate clearly the role 







ensure their survival.  If a specific type of performance has proven critical for the success 
of organizations, then similarly situated organizations that are trying to improve their 
viability adapt this type of performance.  As more organizations adapt the performance, it 
becomes the standard by which all organizations are judged.  Isomorphism occurs in 
GATE members of as state- and national-level gifted and talented associations interact 
with each other, serving as channels of idea and information exchange.  One of the most 
distinct sources of isomorphic momentum is the Jacob K. Javits program, a federal 
initiative created to address disparity in GATE participation.  Relationships built through 
programming like Javits and conferences may impact the protocols that legislators or 
school districts adopt, the training provided to educators and administrators, and how 
these officials understand their tasks.17
 Teachers frequently play the most critical role in the GATE identification process.  
They are able to nominate students for consideration; have a large amount of influence in 
the qualitative evaluation of the student’s performance; and are usually the primary 
connection between parents and the school.  Teachers have first-hand knowledge about 
each student and the teaching process which makes the teachers critical informants on 
students’ capabilities.  Because of the role that teachers play in the implementation 
process, they are creating what it means to be a gifted and talented student.  As the 
analysis will demonstrate, some state laws embrace this feature of education more than 
others.   
  
                                                 
17 While isomorphism usually refers to idea transfer and adaptation across a profession, it is understood in 
this paper as occurring across a job field.  This distinction acknowledges that the training of gifted and 







 In many ways, teachers are street-level bureaucrats-- policy implementers whose 
direct work with constituents results in them making policy on the ground-- and school 
districts foster street-level bureaucracy (Lipsky, 1980).  Street-level bureaucracies 
emerge in organizations that have several competing goals, implying that implementers 
are able to select the standards by which they would like to be evaluated.  Street-level 
bureaucrats often decide to perform the tasks that allow them to shine and that limit the 
amount of blame they can be attributed.  The relationship between the implementer 
(teachers) and the supervisor (principals, the school board, or the state) is conflictual and 
mutually dependent so that the methods by which a supervisor can sanction an 
implementer and the extent to which the supervisor can sanction the implementer are 
circumscribed.  Characteristics of these arrangements include: (a) an accepted give and 
take between implementers and supervisors; (b) an understanding that the implementer is 
making policy; (c) a decreased ability for top-down sanctioning as compared to other 
models of implementation; (d) peripheral accountability; (e) acceptance of ambiguity as 
necessary, expected, and respected; and (f) an understanding that worker rationality and 
mental perspective are important.  Analysis of a law regulating the identification of gifted 
and talented students must take into account consideration the influence that teachers 
have on the implementation process.   
 Together, these concepts suggest identifying nine components of a policy to 
ascertain its implementation potential.  I examine how or whether a policy: (1) defines its 
objectives; (2) outlines a plan for the accomplishment of these objectives; (3) establishes 







defines a clear monitoring process; (6) stipulates training guidelines and/or funds training 
programs for implementers; (7) gives authority to the person or people in most direct 
contact with service recipients; (8) includes performance indicators; and (9) induces buy-
in for policy implementers.18
Methodology 
   
 This analysis tests the hypothesis that given the same objectives, outcomes will be 
more favorable with certain types of governance systems than with others.  That is, given 
convergence on a particular isomorphic space, enrollment rates will vary based on the 
ways in which the actions of local school districts are regulated by the state.  It first asks 
what kinds of governance systems are specified for states with a commitment to 
decreasing disparity in GATE enrollment and then uses this answer to specify the types 
of governance systems that produce high enrollment rates when decreasing disparity is 
the stated policy goal.   
 The methodology adapted in this paper is the constant comparative method of 
joint coding and analysis for the creation of grounded theory.  Theoretical sampling is 
used to select cases such that comparison groups are chosen based on their ability to 
enhance the theoretical development of the emerging categories.  The analysis begins 
with examination of the legislation in four states which have repeatedly been recipients of 
the Jacob K. Javits grant.  Here, receipt of the Javits grant serves as a proxy for 
convergence onto a single isomorphic space because successful grant applicants have 
                                                 
18 These characteristics are consistent with Foster, Coleman, and Gallagher’s (1994) specification of the 
model legislation that states can adapt to enhance the process of finding under-served gifted and talented 







prioritized disparity in GATE as a problem and they have proposed an intervention aimed 
at increasing the GATE participation of students in underserved groups to obtain funding.  
Although the selected states are in the same isomorphic space, several aspects of their 
governance systems diverge, including the mandate to offer gifted and talented programs 
and the provision of state funding for these programs.  The policies of these four states 
are reviewed and coded to reflect their similarities and differences.   
 From this analysis, three components emerge as prominent for addressing 
disparity -- the degree to which the law emphasizes the identification of under-
represented students for participation in the programs; the extent to which the state is 
active in the monitoring process; and the characteristics of the monitoring entity or 
compliance agent.  The relationship between these governance characteristics and 
enrollment rates is examined on additional cases which are selected to diversify the 
sample in terms of demographic composition, regional location, and isomorphic pressure 
-- proxied by the presence of a branch of the National Center for Research on Gifted and 
Talented Education and the receipt of Javits funding.  Case selection results in the 
analysis of legislation from fourteen states: California, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, 
Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, 
Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.  
Data 
 This analysis relates state-level GATE enrollment statistics to state policies on 
gifted education -- the guidelines written under the gifted and talented education heading 
in the state legal code, parts of the code that are referenced within the legislative text, and 







study are from statistics compiled from the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) and the United 
States Bureau of the Census.  The OCR data reports the enrollment rates of students in 
specific academic programs by protected social categories such as race and gender, as 
well as poverty status.  The data used for this analysis are state-level enrollment rates 
reported in the year 2000 survey.  They are combined with statistics on population and 
racial population by state published by the U.S. Census Bureau.  These characteristics are 
detailed in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 3.1 here.] 
 Participation in gifted and talented programs, the dependent variable, is measured 
proportionally.  It equals the percent of gifted enrollment that is black students divided by 
the percent of the enrollment population that is black students,  
  
  black gifted enrollment      ÷ black student enrollment    
      gifted enrollment      school enrollment 
 
When the value of this ratio equals 1, black students participate in gifted programs at a 
rate proportionate to their rate of enrollment in school.  When this ratio is less than 1, 
black students are underrepresented in gifted and talented programs.  When the ratio is 
greater than 1, black students are enrolled in gifted programs at a rate higher than that at 
which they are enrolled in school.  They are, therefore, overrepresented in gifted and 
talented programs.  This measurement reflects the idea that learning abilities are 
randomly distributed throughout the population and throughout subpopulations.  Black 
students are actually overrepresented in one state by 18-percent and the level of 








   
 WHAT KINDS OF GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS ARE SPECIFIED FOR STATES WITH A COMMITMENT TO 
DECREASING DISPARITY IN GATE ENROLLMENT?  A two-tiered accountability system for the 
governance of gifted and talented education exists across states.  On one tier is the 
relationship between states and school districts; on the second is the relationship between 
school districts and parents.  While both levels of accountability are inherently relevant 
for each state, only one tier of accountability relationships is delineated in the legislations 
of some states while both tiers are outlined in the legislation of others.  In state 
legislations that do not acknowledge the responsibility to address enrollment rates in 
gifted and talented programs, discussion of only one tier of accountability is provided and 
the state is characterized as a policy broker or service provider.  In the state whose 
legislation acknowledges this responsibility, both tiers of accountability are outlined and 
the state is characterized as a policy administrator.  These relationships are discussed in 
detail below and are summarized in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 3.2 here.] 
 For example, the Pennsylvania legislation delineates the relationship between the 
school district and parents.  The legislation has deflected a lot of state power back to the 
parent, thereby designating the state as a policy broker between parents and educational 
agencies that can be characterized as isomorphic environments.  Parents have the 
responsibility to help identify the student, to hold schools accountable for the placement 
of their children, to help develop curriculum for gifted students, and to help evaluate the 







are not allowed to participate (the meeting of the gifted individualized educational plan 
team which confirms or rejects the identification decision made by the original 
identification team); yet the parent can petition the decision made in this meeting.  The 
state legislation delegates most of the state’s tasks to professionals bound by career 
norms.  A school psychologist must be a member of the gifted multidisciplinary team; 
only teachers and administrators can serve on the gifted individualized educational plan 
team that makes the final decision on the student’s qualification; and the parent’s 
penultimate appeal is to the courts.   
 What most demonstrate the role definition of the state in Pennsylvania are not the 
provisions its legislation contains for parental involvement nor the degree to which it 
delegates responsibilities to sub-agents, but rather the extent to which the actions of the 
sub-agents are not regulated by the state.  It is ideal that legislation creates space for 
parental involvement and that legislation allows those most qualified to complete tasks to 
take on these responsibilities.  This legislation, however, does not specify the extent to 
which professionals should be trained.  The qualifications for gifted and talented teachers 
are not specified in the legislation neither is a citation provided for legislation that does 
provide guidelines for these professionals.  They are held accountable by those standards 
established within their professions.  Even the offer of information and suggestions from 
the Department of Education lacks authoritative stature in the legislation.  The legislation 
also fails to specify the mandatory qualifications for the administrators and school 
psychologists who are integral to the identification process.  Finally, the appeals process 







Department of Education, which demonstrates the limited monitoring role legislated for 
the state.  
 The Iowa legislation, however, specifies the relationship between the state and the 
school district.  Iowa’s legislation delegates much of the responsibility for identifying 
gifted and talented students to sub-agents whose relationship with the Department of 
Education resembles those described in the theory of street-level bureaucracy.  Gifted and 
talented identification is not a right in Iowa as it is in Pennsylvania; it is a service 
distributed to those who can best use it.  The service component of this law is what makes 
it more explicable by the street-level bureaucrat theory.  Having the ability to determine 
who best benefits without strong parameters set by the legislature allows educators to use 
their personal or professional judgment to select students.  While professional standards 
suggest that a teacher should work hard to improve the education level of her students, 
she also has a professional incentive to be successful at her job.  There is an incentive to 
select for GATE the student for whom she can receive the most acclaim while avoiding 
blame for misidentification.    
 Another aspect of the Iowa law that makes the street-level bureaucrat theory 
applicable is the accepted tension between the state and its sub-agents.  Consider that 
school districts must submit program proposals to the Iowa State Department of 
Education (the Department) for its approval.  The legislation offers few insights as to 
what the Department will approve.  It does, however, prescribe specific elements that 
should be included in the plan.  An example of this phenomenon is the request that the 







placement of pupils in appropriate programs.”  Very subtly, the Department requires that 
identification is ongoing.  The specific method of identification is open for discussion, 
but the state mandates that one-time screening or periodic screening is not acceptable.  
Unlike the agent in the principal-agent theory, the street-level bureaucrat is expected to 
make decisions that may be controversial from those made by the supervisor.  While the 
principal would try to induce a response from the agent that aligns with her own, the 
supervisor constrains the possible decisions the street-level bureaucrat makes and accepts 
her choices.  The fluid nature of the relationships leaves opaque the state’s position on 
how to best combat the underrepresentation of minority, poor, limited English 
proficiency, and disabled students in gifted and talented programs. 
 The definition of giftedness adopted in the Illinois legislation, which also focuses 
on the relationship between the State and school districts, suggests that it too considers 
gifted and talented education programs a service provision.  Gifted and talented students 
are defined as having aptitudes or talents that can “benefit from special cultivation” and 
the legislation suggests that the state is in a service position.  With this perspective on 
GATE, Illinois has designed a street-level bureaucracy to administer this program: 
guidelines on service provision are very few and districts are allowed much freedom in 
creating and reporting on the programs they design.   
 In contrast to the Iowa legislation, and diverging from street-level bureaucracy 
predictions, the Illinois legislation delegates the responsibility to outline qualifications of 
teachers and administrators to its Advisory Council.  The Council regulates the 







must submit to the Council the qualifications of those who have assessed students, made 
placement recommendations, and consulted with the districts on their programs.  While 
funding provides ample incentive for developing an acceptable identification plan, the 
lack of guidelines for these plans reveals that a high level of discretion has been 
delegated to teachers and administrators.  That there are high expectations and few 
regulations suggests also that the Council is dependent upon isomorphic tendencies to 
constrain the selection and actions of the school districts.  Although responsibility for 
gifted and talented education is concentrated in the Advisory Council, the Council is 
highly accountable to the state.  Not only are Council members appointed by the state 
Board of Education, the secretary of the Council is a member of the Board of Education 
as well, suggesting that the state may closely monitor the council’s actions. 
 The gifted and talented legislation in Texas, which characterizes the state as a 
policy administrator, delineates accountability between the state and school districts and 
between school districts and parents.  The legislation delegates much of the state’s 
responsibility to sub-agents and makes them highly accountable to the state.  It also sets 
up a three-tier rating system (acceptable, recommended, and exemplary) which assists 
parents in monitoring the school districts.  At the acceptable level, the legislation has very 
strong principal-agent relationships.  Districts create their own identification protocols 
which suggests that accountability is established through isomorphism or is guided by the 
street-level bureaucracy principles.  However, the state combines this freedom with very 







which they receive it.  In providing these details, the legislation reinforces the state’s 
authority over its sub-agents.   
 At the recognized level, the state allows for more isomorphic influence: local 
school district boards of trustees are educated on the standards and protocols created by 
the state, thereby reducing the unchecked influence of local culture, norms, and politics in 
the identification process.  At the same time, the state maintains the level at which it 
holds educators accountable.  At the exemplary level, the state once again increases the 
level of isomorphic influence by stipulating that administrators and counselors receive 
professional development annually.   
 As the isomorphic levels increase, the state also increases the extent to which 
parental involvement is legislated.  Advocacy roles for parents are progressively 
strengthened in the legislation; however, the Texas statute does not explicitly 
acknowledge the principal-agent relationship between the parents and the state.  The state 
does empower the parent to sanction the performance of any specific district.  The three-
tiered classification system signals to parents the service that they are receiving in a 
particular district as well as the places within the state where they can receive the services 
they desire.  Parents are empowered to vote with their feet.  
 The Texas legislation takes responsibility for combating the underrepresentation 
problem.  It also establishes a strong principal-agent relationship between the state and its 
agencies and fosters an accountability relationship between parents and the state.  
Pennsylvania, while attentive to the underrepresentation problem, does not accept 







parents and educators so that parents may monitor the identification process.  Iowa’s 
legislation is not attentive to the underrepresentation problem and defers much of its 
responsibility for identification to local school districts.  This state does, however, 
maintain some regulatory power over its agencies by mandating the level at which sub-
agents must be trained and by directly monitoring one of the agencies.  The Illinois 
legislation completely ignores the underrepresentation problem and only mildly 
constrains the actions of its agencies. 
 Analysis of laws governing gifted and talented education in Illinois, Iowa, Texas, 
and Pennsylvania leads to this proposition:  
There are three types of legislations governing gifted and talented 
programs: policy administrators who manage especially well-
developed accountability relationships between the state, parents, 
and school districts; policy brokers who negotiate the relationship 
between parents and school districts; and service agencies whose 
responsibility consists of connecting parents to school districts. 
Policy administrator legislations are characteristic of states that 
acknowledge a responsibility for the proper identification of gifted 
and talented students.  Policy broker and service agency 
legislations do not acknowledge this responsibility. 
 
 
From this proposition emerge two hypotheses that are now tested on the full sample: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Legislation in states with the same level of 
commitment to the identification of students in underrepresented 
groups outlines similar monitoring processes. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Students from underrepresented groups are enrolled 
in gifted and talented education programs at higher rates in states 
with policy administrator legislations than in states with policy 
broker or service provider legislations. 
 
 The working proposition suggests that there should be a relationship between the 







in gifted and talented education programs for students in under-served groups is given 
high consideration in the law of a particular state, and if that state is holding localities 
accountable for the outcomes of gifted and talented programming, then African American 
student enrollment in these states should be higher than it is in states that do not give high 
consideration to the underserved gifted and talented population.  In sum, students from 
disadvantaged groups should be enrolled in gifted and talented education programs at a 
higher rate in states that are legislated as policy administrators than in states that are 
legislated as policy brokers or service providers (HYPOTHESIS 2).   
Classifying additional state laws and correlating them with Office for Civil Rights 
(OCR) data will allow examination of the hypothesized trends in order to elucidate the 
relationships between legislation governing gifted and talented education and African 
American student enrollment rates.  These relationships are summarized in Table 3, and 
their major points of interest – mandates for service, task definition, and monitoring 
relationships -- discussed below.   
[Insert Table 3.3 about here] 
Evaluating HYPOTHESIS 1 
 Mandates for identification and service: Is GATE mandatory?  
 Only three of the fourteen state laws do not require that students with high 
potential be identified as gifted students.  These are the laws in Michigan, Illinois, and 
California.  Local school districts in each of these states have the option to provide gifted 
and talented education programs, and they may choose not to do so.  The identification of 







Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia).  
In each of these states, with the exception of Connecticut, districts must provide 
differentiated education services for students so identified.19
 Task definition: Are underrepresented students a priority? 
  While service is not 
mandatory in California and Connecticut, the legislation in these states calls for a high 
level of attention to the enrollment of traditionally underrepresented students in gifted 
education programs when they are offered.  
 The state laws take up the task of identifying underrepresented students to 
different degrees.  Some state legislation calls attention to the placement of traditionally 
underrepresented students; other legislation requires direct action on the placement of 
these students; yet some legislation does not at all take up the task.  Five state laws fit 
into this final category.  The laws of Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, and Mississippi do not 
consider the traditionally underrepresented population at all.  The Illinois law, however, 
explicitly states that membership in traditionally-underrepresented groups will not be 
considered in the identification or service process. 
 Contrastingly, the laws of Pennsylvania, Georgia, North Carolina, and Maryland 
call attention to the representation of students from traditionally underrepresented groups.  
This task definition generally takes the form of a universal claim such as this one: “Gifted 
and talented students are to be found in youth from all cultural groups, across all 
economic strata, and in all areas of human endeavor (Maryland Annotated Code § 8-
                                                 
19 There is one caveat for this statement.  The legislation for the state of Iowa mandates that students be 
identified and requires that as many of these students as possible – within budgetary and teaching 







202).”  Attention to underrepresented groups is specifically stated in a way that brings 
awareness to the level of diversity in gifted education programs.  
 The laws of the remaining states (California, Connecticut, Tennessee, Texas, and 
Virginia) suggest a higher level of commitment to the participation of all qualified 
students in gifted education programs.  They not only pay attention to the 
underrepresentation of these students in their programs, but also encourage or require 
proactive measures to consider their placement.  Connecticut’s law, for example, states 
that if enrollment rates for racial and ethnic minority and disabled students in special 
education are disproportionate, then identification and placement policy, procedures, and 
practices will be reviewed (Connecticut General Statute Volume 3 Title 10 Chapter 164 
§10-76gg).  The Virginia law requires that local school district plans for gifted education 
include “Assurances that (i) testing and evaluative materials selected and administered 
are sensitive to cultural, racial, and linguistic differences, (ii) identification procedures 
are constructed so that they identify high potential/ability in all underserved culturally 
diverse, low socio-economic, and disabled populations …(8 VAC 20-40-60)”   
 Given these levels of commitment to the identification of gifted students in 
underrepresented groups, similar monitoring processes should be found amongst the laws 
within these groups of states: (a) Connecticut, Virginia, California, Tennessee, and Texas, 
which all take responsibility for the identification of underserved students; and (b) 
Pennsylvania, Georgia, North Carolina, Maryland, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, 
and Illinois, which do not stipulate this responsibility (HYPOTHESIS 1).   







  ‘High accountability’ laws specify strong accountability relationships between 
the state legislature, local school districts, and parents.  Generally, the local education 
agency is directly responsible to the state’s Department of Education.  Frequently, the 
liaison between these two entities is an Advisory Committee on Gifted Education.  The 
accountability relationship to parents is delineated by the extent to which districts are 
expected to allow parents to have an active role in the identification process and the roles 
parents are designated.  In these legislations, local school districts are to report to parents 
the plans they have for gifted and talented education.  Parents are to serve as policy 
monitors by participating in the identification process and by filing grievances when they 
do not agree with local district decisions.   
 The characteristics of strong accountability relationships are captured in six 
questions: Does the legislation set up a system for monitoring identification (yes)?  Does 
the legislation detail incentives for following identification procedures (yes)?  Does the 
legislation detail a hierarchy (yes)?  If so, does the legislation detail the flow of 
information between levels of the hierarchy (yes)?  Does the legislation allow for 
peripheral accountability (no)?  Does the legislation include provisions for parent 
participation (yes)?  Each of these elements is captured in the laws of Virginia, 
Connecticut, California, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Tennessee.   
 Contrastingly, the regulation of gifted education is delegated to extra-legislative 
agencies like the courts or teachers’ organizations in some states.  In these ‘professionally 
regulated’ states, the exact nature of giftedness is determined by people whose 







are selected and applied by individuals with unspecified qualifications, with the exception 
of their membership in a particular profession, leading to the conclusion that the norms of 
their profession are used to determine who is gifted.  
 The characteristics of professionally-regulated gifted identification processes are 
captured by these questions:  Does the legislation describe the intended make-up of 
participants (no)?  Does the legislation contain provisions for teacher training (no)?  Does 
the legislation require a minimum level of training or qualifications needed by those 
individuals responsible for administering examinations (no)?  The answer is no for each 
of these questions in two states – Pennsylvania and Michigan.  Other state legislations 
fail to describe the make-up of participants and omit regulation for only teachers or test 
administrators.  State legislations that omit teacher qualifications are: Illinois, Maryland, 
and Mississippi.   
 Legislation that acknowledges, honors, and incorporates the specialized 
knowledge of implementers allows teachers a very high level of influence in the 
identification process, although it specifies the type of training teachers must have.  
These laws also allow for peripheral accountability in the process, meaning that the 
legislations allow implementers to decide if they are successful.  While teachers always 
play a crucial role in the identification process, they are sometimes allowed to have the 
“final say” in the identification process.  For example, the best benefit clause in the Iowa 
legislation gives final decision-making power to the teacher.  The criteria on which 
teachers determine gifted status are not clear.  Furthermore, this process of identification 







district teachers have identified the students who would most benefit from the programs 
offered if its placement and identification records are challenged.   
 The characteristics of this type of legislation are captured by these questions: 
Does the legislation allow for peripheral accountability (yes)?  Does the legislation 
contain provisions for teacher training (yes)?  Does the legislation allow for ambiguity in 
identification (yes)?  The legislations of Iowa, Kansas, and North Carolina meet each of 
these qualifications.  
 In general, HYPOTHESIS 1 is supported.  In states where the legislation takes 
responsibility for the enrollment of underserved students, the legislation also details 
systems of high accountability between parents, the state, and school districts.  Such 
highly developed systems of accountability are missing from the legislation for states that 
are less assertive about changing the participation rates of the underserved population in 
gifted education.  The only exception to this rule is the legislation in Georgia, a deviation 
that will be explored in the upcoming sections.   
Evaluating Hypothesis 2 
 When underrepresentation rates are considered, there is also support for 
HYPOTHESIS 2 – that rates of underrepresentation are lower in states with more 
accountability -- even though there is not a consistent pattern between enrollment rates 
and the full range of attentiveness to the underrepresentation problem.  Not all states in 
which legislation is attentive to the underrepresentation problem have higher African 
American enrollment rates than do states with legislation that is indifferent to the 







responsibility for addressing the underrepresentation problem do have lower rates of 
underrepresentation than do states that do not take responsibility for the problem.  The 
exception to this rule is Virginia, a state in which legislation takes responsibility for the 
underrepresentation problem, and still African American students are underrepresented 
by 66-percent.    
Exploring the deviating cases 
 This extreme deviation from the expectation and from the enrollment rates of the 
states with similar legislations suggests that whatever differences exist between the 
Virginia legislation and those of the other states taking responsibility for the 
underrepresentation of underserved students – Tennessee, Texas,  California, and 
Connecticut -- is extremely detrimental to African American student enrollment.  The 
legislation diverges from the pack on two points.  The first of these is that it allows 
ambiguity in the identification process.  There does appear to be some general 
relationship between the acceptance of ambiguity in the identification process and the 
rate at which African American students are enrolled in gifted and talented programs.  
With the exception of Georgia, each state with a higher rate of underrepresentation than 
52-percent allows ambiguity in the identification process.20
                                                 
20 Georgia presents somewhat of an interesting case as it has legislative components that are characteristic 
of the high accountability legislations, but also allows for peripheral accountability.  Perhaps allowing 
peripheral accountability is responsible for the low level of African American student participation in gifted 
and talented education.   
  The second point on which 
the Virginia legislation differs from the other legislations that take responsibility for the 
enrollment rates of underserved students is that it outlines different roles for parents in 







  The legislation of most states in the sample includes provisions for parent 
participation in the identification process.  These provisions vary most on the ways in 
which parents are notified about the identification process.  Four approaches to parental 
notification about the identification process are taken in these legislations: non-existent, 
indifferent, parentally-empowering, or change-oriented.  Legislation that takes the non-
existent approach does not discuss a plan to educate parents about the identification 
process.  This approach is taken in the Virginia legislation.  Indifferent legislation 
mandates that each school district designs and implements a plan to educate parents about 
the identification process, but no measures are taken to insure that this knowledge is 
accessible to a broad community of parents.  The relationship is indifferent in that it does 
not recognize or try to change the fact that parental participation is highly concentrated in 
socially empowered groups of the community.  By using this formulation of the parental 
relationship, the legislation allows the district to determine the demographics of parental 
participation, making the status quo a viable and legal option.  This approach to parent 
notification is found in Georgia. 
 Parentally empowering relationships also mandate that districts implement their 
own plans for parental notification.  However these legislations specify the mechanisms 
through which parents may contest the identification decisions made by the district.  The 
legislation in Pennsylvania is one of these types of legislations.  While these legislations 
are not designed explicitly to motivate a new population of parents, they provide the tools 
for already mobilized parents to be effective in their interactions with the school districts.  







have some source of knowledge about the programs offered other than the school district, 
then they are better equipped to advocate for their children’s participation than they 
would be in states where indifferent relationships are legislated. 
 Change-oriented legislation is written to recognize and change the fact that 
parental participation is highly concentrated in socially empowered groups of the 
community.  In these legislations, the ways in which parents are notified about gifted and 
talented education is more specifically laid out than in those of the other states.  With 
such detailed notification plans, this type of legislation attempts to broaden the scope of 
the public that can effectively participate in the identification process.    
[Insert Table 3.4 here.] 
 
 Table four displays the relationship between the level of black student 
underrepresentation and the legislated relationships between parents and school districts 
for those states whose attention to underrepresentation and monitoring processes foster 
the expectation of low rates of underrepresentation.  The more specific is legislation, 
especially in the area of parental notification and participation, the higher is the black 
gifted ratio.  That is, the rate of black underrepresentation in gifted education decreases 
with decreasing room for discretionary interpretation about the roles parents can play in 
the gifted identification process.  This relationship is illustrated especially well in the 
legislations of California, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Tennessee where the proportion of 
black gifted students is highest amongst the studied sample.   
 In California, where black students are underrepresented by 50-percent, the 







Instruction encourages “the development of procedures that assure the ongoing 
participation of parents of gifted and talented pupils in the planning and evaluation of the 
program” by requiring that school districts specify such a plan in their applications for 
program funding.  Pennsylvania, with a slightly lower rate of underrepresentation – 48-
percent, has provisions for parental involvement in student identification that are more 
highly specified than those in California.  As detailed in the previous section of this 
analysis, the provisions for parental involvement in the placement process are very 
strong.  Parents are given the right to participate actively in the selection of the student 
for these services and to monitor this process.  They do not, however, describe the ways 
in which the program should be advertised to the community at large, a critical first step 
for alerting parents to the possibility of gifted programs for their children.  This also 
seems to be a critical condition for higher representation for black students in gifted 
education. 
  The provisions for parental involvement in the legislations of Texas and 
Tennessee, where blacks are underrepresented by only 30-percent and overrepresented by 
18-percent (respectively), do offer guidance for this pre-identification portion of the 
gifted and talented identification process.  At the acceptable level of the Texas State Plan 
for Gifted and Talented Education, district polices on gifted and talented education are 
disseminated to parents as is the array of gifted and talented learning opportunities 
available.  At the recognized level, parents are able to suggest identification procedures 
before the local school board adopts an identification procedure for the district; annual 







orientation and periodic updates about services provided are held for the parents of 
identified students.  Parents in exemplary districts annually are able to influence 
identification procedures as individuals, as members of a parent association for gifted and 
talented, and as members of a parental advisory board.  
 The Tennessee gifted plan designates an extensive pre-identification initiative 
called child find.21
                                                 
21 The source of the child find initiative is the 1998 Dispute Resolution between the U.S. Office for Civil 
Rights and the Tennessee State Department of Education.  In this agreement, the Tennessee Department of 
Education agreed to implement procedures in the gifted and talented program that ensured that all students 
in the state had equal access to gifted education, pursuant to Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act by May1, 
1999. Notably, black students were underrepresented in Tennessee’s gifted programs by 15-percent in 
1998. 
  The child find program is an interagency community awareness 
campaign designed to educate the public at large about the characteristics of gifted 
students, benefits of receiving proper service, and gifted education options available in 
the district.  The state-developed child find brochure is to be placed in public service 
buildings including government health clinics, community centers, and public libraries.  
The child find initiative also incorporates advertisement through various cultural means: 
radio and TV; newspapers, including community publications; grocery sack stuffers; 
stuffers for utility bills, bank statements and cable TV bills; posters; brochures; films and 
tapes; newsletters to school personnel and other agencies; letters to parents; enclosures in 
AFDC or other public payment envelopes; and bumper stickers.  Moreover, the initiative 
has a built-in assessment: “[these activities] should result in referrals [for gifted 
education] and referrals should come from diverse sources, which include parents, 
outside agencies, and teachers (Division of Special Education, 2003 #13).”  No other 







process.  And in no other state are black students overrepresented in gifted and talented 
education programs as they are here, by 18-percent. 
Discussion 
 
 In 1989, the gifted and talented policy community begins experiencing increasing 
federal pressure to address the under-participation of students from vulnerable 
populations in gifted and talented education programs.  By the 1994 publication of the 
Final Report of the Gifted Education Policy Studies Program, researchers are able to pin-
point the policy processes associated with improved outcomes for under-served 
populations.  They also are able to outline the types of legislation victoriously adapted 
with the cooperation of concerned legislators, educators, and citizens – producing a 
recommended format for GATE legislation, and they are able to publicize these findings 
widely within the GATE community.  In addition, a number of legal battles over minority 
student enrollment in GATE in the specific as well as within school segregation in the 
general had added to the fertility of the policy environment.   
 In response, states have largely adapted the recommended format for gifted and 
talented legislation.  Yet, they have not uniformly changed their gifted and talented 
policies.  As demonstrated above, the content of state legislation varies greatly, with each 
state adapting its own expectations, resource distribution, and manner of communicating 
with localities about gifted and talented education.  With pressure on states to address the 
underrepresentation problem coming from the national government, multiple levels of 
courts, federal agencies like the Office for Civil Rights, and research practitioners, a 







developed.  Because each of these pressure-sources holds states responsible for the 
enrollment rates produced within their boundaries, it becomes critical to understand how 
states manage the responsibility for this policy arena.   
 States adopt one of three positions within the policy environment: service agent, 
policy broker, or policy administrator.  In the service agent position, the state acts much 
like an agency for temporary employment, connecting service providers with individuals 
who may find desirable what they offer.  As with such an agency, the service that one 
receives depends on the person with whom one is connected, although there is a 
screening process amongst service providers so that most have had similar training or 
meet minimal criteria.  As policy broker, the state negotiates the relationship between 
those providing service and those receiving it.  The state’s position is not one of exact 
neutrality in that it does recognize under-service as a policy problem; but the state does 
not take an assertive role in ameliorating the problem.  The state creates the boundaries 
within which parents interact with teachers and administrators.  It also furnishes a set of 
rules that governs each stage of interaction and details mechanisms for redress when 
these rules are breached or outcomes are unexpected.  As policy administrator, the state 
constructs a complete plan for an area of policy, which includes goals, methods of 
fulfilling those goals, ways for monitoring progress towards the attainment of these goals, 
and ways for service recipients to hold them accountable for the outcomes.   
 Policy administrators may be better at producing policy outcomes than are policy 
brokers or service agencies.  Or it may be the case that states are legislated as policy 







productive policy administrator role, state legislations construct different ways of 
communicating with constituents, distinguished by the extent to which they incorporate 
constituents into the plans they adapt.  For gifted and talented education, state legislation 
incorporates parents into the identification process at different degrees of intensity.  In 
states where legislation less intensely incorporates parents into the identification process 
there is less success at proportionally enrolling historically underserved students in gifted 
programs than there is in states where legislation more intensely incorporates parents into 
the process.   
 This analysis has worked to make states active participants in the gifted and 
talented education environment.  It takes seriously the flexibility with which states can 
act in response to national pressures for policy outcomes, with regard to their 
constituents, and in concert with their agencies.  The analysis has uncovered three 
legislative tools guiding the outcomes in this policy arena: (1) legislative position toward 
the identification of underrepresented students; (2) types of oversight legislated; and (3) 
the legislated relationship between parents and school officials.  
 The analysis has shown that states whose legislation acknowledges having a 
responsibility for the proper identification of gifted and talented students are legislated as 
policy administrators who manage especially well-developed accountability relationships 
between themselves, parents, and school districts.  States whose legislation does not 
acknowledge this responsibility are legislated as policy brokers who negotiate the 
relationship between parents and school districts or they are legislated as service agencies 







this chapter has also demonstrated that the relationship between legislation and 
identification cannot be explained without taking into consideration the power of the state 
to set the agenda between political actors and political institutions.  Thus, the analysis 
suggests that while policy position, monitoring processes, and agenda-setting power work 
together, the state’s agenda-setting power may be most critical to the equitable 
participation of underrepresented students in gifted and talented education programs.  
  In a policy environment where outcomes and criteria are uncertain and contested, 
the manner in which the state regulates the relationship between political actors and 
political institutions guides the distribution of goods and services.  While it is critical that 
state legislation take up the task of increasing the participation of underrepresented 
groups in gifted and talented education and that it monitors progress toward this goal, 
these actions alone are not enough to make the programs representative.  The state must 
create political battlegrounds on which advocates for students in underrepresented groups 
can participate.  It must use its agenda-setting power as a policy lever to reduce the 






























BLACK GIFTED/ % 
BLACK 
ENROLLMENT) 
NATIONAL 46,306,355 15.8 16.99 8.23 0.48 
CALIFORNIA 5,965,746 14.5 8.48 4.26 0.50 
CONNECTICUT 532,146 30.5 13.28 6.37 0.48 
GEORGIA 1,413,899 12.5 38.8 14.65 0.38 
ILLINOIS 2,013,369 16.0 21.36 7.77 0.36 
IOWA 484,514 12.3 3.97 1.83 0.46 
KANSAS 457,254 30.6 8.75 2.59 0.30 
MARYLAND 839,352 8.4 37.05 16.04 0.43 
MICHIGAN 1,712,983 27.7 19.59 9.11 0.47 
MISSISSIPPI 494,623 17.7 50.65 22.46 0.44 
NORTH CAROLINA 1,253,125 10.0 30.6 10.33 0.34 
PENNSYLVANIA 1,805,431 20.4 14.42 7.53 0.52 
TENNESSEE 905,602 33.5 24.44 28.77 1.18 
TEXAS 3,907,774 11.1 14.23 9.95 0.70 




TABLE 3.2: CHARACTERISTICS OF LEGISLATION 
 ILLINOIS IOWA PENNSYLVANIA TEXAS 
TASK Identify all gifted students 
Identify and serve as 
many gifted students as 
possible 
Identify and serve all 
gifted students 
Provide all students 
with challenging 
academic opportunities 
that enable them to 
reach their full potential 
 
DEFINITION OF GIFTED 
Beyond average mental 
acceleration; Aptitude 
or talent that can 




potential ability in 
intellectual, creative 
thinking, leadership, 
visual and performing 
arts, specific aptitude 
130 IQ + criteria 
-- Or -- simply meeting 
the criteria 
High level of 
accomplishment relative 




PRINCIPAL-AGENT State – district State -- teacher Parent – district State – district  Parent -- district 
ISOMORPHIC 









Not present Not present 
EQUALITY PRINCIPLE: 
ATTENTIVE TO? No No Yes Yes 
EQUALITY PRINCIPLE: 








Table 3.3: Characteristics of state legislation 
 KS VA NC IL GA MD MS IA MI CT CA PA TX        TN 
Does the legislation mandate 
Identification? YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES NO YES NO YES YES YES 
Does the legislation mandate 
service? YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Has there been litigation on 
within school segregation in 
gifted education? 
NO NO NO YES YES YES YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO 
Does the legislation define 
gifted and talented? NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Does the legislation describe 
the intended make-up of 
participants? 
NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO YES NO YES YES 
Does the legislation set up a 
system for monitoring 
identification? 
YES YES YES YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Does the legislation detail 
incentives for following 
identification procedures? 
NO YES NO YES NO YES YES YES YES NO YES NO YES YES 
Does the legislation detail a 
hierarchy? YES YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Does the legislation contain 
provisions for teacher 
training? 
YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Does the legislation require a 
minimum level of tester 
training? 
NO YES NO YES YES NO NO NO NO YES YES NO YES YES 
Does the legislation provide a 
mechanism for information 
sharing? 
NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Does the legislation allow 
ambiguity in identification? YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO 
Does the legislation allow for 
peripheral accountability? YES NO YES NO YES NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Does the legislation allow for 
adaptability? YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO NO YES YES NO YES 
Minority student enrollment 
(%) 21.0 36.2 38.6 40.0 46.0 46.5 52.2 9.8 25.9 29.2 63.7 20.9 57.0 27.5 
Rate of underrepresentation 










Table 3.4: Relationship legislated between parents and school districts 
 KS VA22 NC  IL GA MD MS IA MI CT CA PA TX        TN 
Is the legislation attentive to 
the underrepresentation 
problem? 
NO YES YES NO YES YES NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Does the legislation take 
responsibility for addressing 
the underrepresentation 
problem? 
NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Does the legislation set up a 
system for monitoring 
identification? 
YES YES YES YES YES NO YES YES NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Does the legislation detail 
incentives for following 
identification procedures? 
NO YES NO YES NO YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES 
Does the legislation detail a 
hierarchy? YES YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Does the legislation detail the 
flow of information between 
levels of the hierarchy? 
NO YES YES YES YES N/A NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Does the legislation allow 
ambiguity in identification? YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO 
Does the legislation allow for 
peripheral accountability? YES NO YES NO YES NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Does the legislation include 
provisions for parent 
participation? 
NO YES YES NO YES NO YES NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Expectation of low 
underrepresentation NO NO NO NO PERHAPS NO NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Type of parental participation 





Rate of underrepresentation 
(%) 70 66 66 64 62 57 56 54 53 52 50 48 30 (18) 
 
                                                 
22 The rate of underrepresentation for black students is drastically higher in the state of Virginia than is expected given the surface characteristics of the 
legislation.  As in the four states discussed above, the legislation is attentive to underrepresented students; includes a system of monitoring with 
accompanying incentives; and has provisions for parental participation in the identification process.  The gifted identification plan, however, is 
submitted to the state by the school district as opposed to being specified by the state.  The local school district is allowed to the set the agenda for the 
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“Policy-making in the schools is far more routinized than in redevelopment; it is far more professionalized 
– one might say bureaucratized – than in the parties, in the sense that almost all of the people who make 
day-to-day decisions about the schools meet certain professional standards and have a strong sense of their 
own professionalism …… there are a number of diverse elements in the political stratus whose educational 
wants and concerns the leaders attempt to conciliate, anticipate, and satisfy.”  -- Dahl, Who Governs 
 
 “Here is the crux of the problem of race relations – the redefinition of the sense of group position so that 
the status advantage of the white man is no longer an advantage, so that an American may acknowledge his 
Negro ancestry without apologizing for it … They [black people] live in a society in which to be 
unconditionally “American” is to be white, and to be black is a misfortune [pp. 108-9].” – Killian and 
Grigg, quoted by Ture and Hamilton, Black Power 
 
 In chapter three, I found that the enrollment rates of African American students in 
gifted and talented education programs (or GATE) are exceptionally high in states where 
state policies (1) explicitly incorporate parents and community advocates into the gifted 
identification process and (2) specify steps to hold school districts responsible for the 
resultant enrollment rates.   This chapter assesses the extent to which  the correlation 
between the accountability systems and enrollment rates reflects the level of parent 
participation induced by participatory clauses and the extent to which if reflects the ways 
that educators respond to these new regulations.   
 The coproduction framework outlines a theoretical foundation for participation as 
the causal mechanism for high enrollment rates.  As the predominant framework 
theorizing political participation at the policy implementation stage, coproduction 
maintains that cooperation between citizens and governments maximizes policy 






framework would attribute the relationship between the legislations and enrollments to 
the benefits of parent participation in the gifted identification process.  However, the 
coproduction framework adopts a restrictive definition of participation which excludes 
the types of activities that prove beneficial for securing GATE enrollments.  Moreover, 
the assumption of policy implementer responsiveness to participation underlying the 
coproduction framework is fallacious and particularly detrimental for understanding 
policy outcomes for African Americans.   
I argue that these legislations are effective because they solidify accountability 
relationships that politically incorporate African Americans into the realm of education 
governance rather than because they involve previously apathetic parents in the 
identification process. By making school districts accountable to parents and 
communities whose voices in education policy historically have been ignored, these 
clauses induce preemptive implementation of African Americans’ preferences for more 
equitably distributed policy outcomes.  The result is not a more egalitarian distribution of 
GATE enrollments, but rather a more politically responsive distribution.   
Parent Participation and Educator Response for Gifted Education 
 
 Parent participation in the education process is a widely touted mechanism for 
increasing African American enrollment in gifted and talented education programs 
amongst policy makers and academic scholars (Donovan and Cross, 2002; Ford, 1996; 
Oakes, 1986).  While  contemporary research promotes increased participation from 
African American parents in the gifted identification process as a policy lever, it rarely 






elicit from educators and administrators.23
 I classify the several types of interactions between parents and educators into two 
general categories: involvement and intervention.  Involvement activities support the 
educational administration in its current form.  They help to reinforce the activities taking 
place in the classroom and to increase educators’ capacities to continue these activities.  
Volunteering to read in a classroom, to serve as a teacher’s aide, to chaperone a fieldtrip, 
and to fundraise are examples of parent involvement.   
  Though scarce in comparison to vibrant 
British and French discourses about the relationship between types of parent involvement 
and antagonism between educators and parents(Crozier, 2000; Limage, 2000; 
Cullingford, 1996; Vincent, 1996; Lewis, 1985), several scholars have documented this 
antagonism in the U.S. context and in doing so have highlighted the differential impact of 
the antagonism because of economic class and race (Lewis, 2008; Danns, 2003; Ford, 
1996; Henig et al, 1999; Lareau, 1989; Williams, 1989; Lightfoot, 1978). 
 The underlying premise of parent intervention, on the other hand, is to change the 
course of action of the administration.  Intervention can take place on behalf of an 
individual student such as requesting that the student be placed in a particular classroom 
or program (i.e., placement in a gifted and talented education program rather than a 
regular education program).  Intervention can also be directed towards systemic change 
through which educators are asked to alter the underlying logic of the education program.  
An example of a systemic intervention is requesting a change in the tenor of a program or 
school (i.e., desegregate a school or incorporate African American history into the history 
                                                 
23 I use educators and administrators interchangeably to refer to teachers, principals, and other 






curriculum).  Additionally, systemic intervention can be targeted at one particular 
educator which would have an effect on how the educational system will evolve over 
time.  An example of this type of intervention is requesting actions against particular 
teachers or administrators (i.e., classroom removal, reclassification, or reassignment).    
 Educators are generally receptive to parent involvement but are apprehensive 
about parent intervention (Shipps, 2003; Crozier, 2000; Vincent, 1996; Williams, 1989).  
This apprehension originates from the fact that interventions implicitly and explicitly 
interrogate the proficiency of educators’ job performances and diminishes the levels of 
control they have over their professional domain (Lareau, 1989; Williams, 1989).  When 
educators can do so, they ignore parent interventions.  However,  their ability to ignore 
parent interventions is highly circumscribed by parental resources -- especially the ability 
of parents to exit from the education system if educators do not comply with the demands 
of their interventions and ability of parents to levy connections with high ranking school 
officials or politicians to pressure educators for their preferred outcomes.  
 Given the imperative to respond to intervention requests from well-resourced 
parents, educators face three options.  Their first option is to ignore the requests of 
interveners and face two penalties – the sanction against their professionalism levied by 
the request (i.e., a reduction in their proprietary claim to status as the primary experts in 
education) and the potential exit of the student from the system.  Educators’ second 
option is to honor the requests of interveners once they are voiced.  In this case, educators 
receive only one penalty- a reduction in their proprietary claim to educational expertise.  






requests are made.  That is, educators can avoid the reduction in their proprietary claim to 
educational expertise that is implicitly levied through intervention activities by acting 
preemptively to provide the desired services.   When possible, educators choose to act 
preemptively in the provision of education to students whose parents engage in or are 
likely to engage in intervention activities.  Educators offer these students preferred 
curriculum; place them in classrooms with teachers whose teaching styles are highly 
valued; and assign principals and teachers to schools to complement their enrollment 
patterns (Lareau, 1989; Williams, 1989).   
 Further complicating the relationship between parent participation and African 
American student outcomes is the fact that educators use parents’ presumed 
socioeconomic status and race as gauges to determine whether they need to be 
preemptive, resulting in more responsiveness to middle-class parents than to lower-class 
parents (Rorrer, 2003; Lareau, 1989; Oakes, 1986). Responsiveness to middle-class white 
parents’ requests frequently results in inequitable distribution of educational goods.  For 
example, disparate enrollment rates of black and white students in gifted and talented 
education programs have been attributed to parent intervention in the identification 
process (McBee, 2006; Ford, 1996; Donovan and Cross, 1991; Oakes, 1986).  Middle-
class white parents more frequently request gifted programming for their children who do 
not initially qualify for the programs than do African Americans parents.  Early 
qualitative research reported that even when students did not meet enrollment 
requirements, administrators were likely to enroll students whose parents intervened on 






quantitative study of gifted identification reports that white parents are still three to four 
times more likely to intervene in the identification process than African American parents 
and that their intervention activities are more likely to be successful than those of African 
American parents (65% versus 40% success rate).   
 The complex relationship between class and race in the United States means that 
the use of socioeconomic status as the proxy for preemptive action creates racially 
differentiated outcomes.  Rothstein (2004) argues that black educational outcomes are 
lower than white educational outcomes because blacks’ ‘lack of class’ –exemplified as 
not having access to wealth and as engaging in behaviors to compensate for 
discriminatory markets -- prevents them from taking advantage of the educational system 
surrounding them.   The lack of family wealth (and therefore lack of down payment 
assistance) restricts the quality of the educational market African Americans can enter as 
public education in most states is funded by local taxes.  Rothstein documents that blacks 
are more likely than whites to apportion their incomes to compensate for market 
discrimination and therefore invest in people who are less economically stable than they 
are – relatives and members of their extended networks -- rather than in purchases that 
enhance intellectual advancement like museum memberships and books.  Finally, 
Rothstein claims that blacks match their motivation to excel in school to the low market 
returns to schooling they anticipate receiving from a discriminatory job market.  In sum, 
Rothstein argues, blacks operate in a class-demarcated habitus that circumscribes their 






Rothstein’s explication of how class operates to suppress educational outcomes 
for blacks demonstrates that class is not a race-neutral construct.  Instead, race and class 
are fused together with even broader implications for the relationship between parents, 
schools and black educational outcomes than Rothstein identifies.  These implications 
surface as the centrality of race in blacks’ social and political lives is incorporated into 
the discussion, revealing the importance of class as a supply-side variable that explains 
how schools respond to parents and when they work to honor parents’ quests for 
educational excellence.    
Scholars like Wilson (1980) theorized that as the economic distribution within the 
black community widened, race would become less significant in the lives of black 
Americans.  Blacks’ habits, tastes, political preferences, and social outlooks would begin 
to mirror those of the white America their financial status made more readily available to 
them.  Moreover, the barriers excluding blacks from the mainstream social and political 
life would be dismantled.  The significance of the racial community would diminish and 
the ways in which race delimited the lives of blacks would disappear.  While economic 
improvement has made ‘mainstream America’ more accessible to blacks, it has not yet 
resulted in a complete reconstitution of racial relationships.  Social barriers, while less 
rigid, remain in tact: for the same level of education and income, blacks are less likely to 
be shown a home in the same neighborhood (Massey and Denton, 1993; Yinger, 1986) 
and are less likely to be hired for the same job (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Pager, 
2003; Darity and Mason, 1998; Turner et al, 1991) than whites.  For the same level of 






Card and Krueger, 1993).  Controlling for income, the political preferences of blacks and 
whites diverge as do their outlooks on the state of America (Dawson, 2002; Kinder and 
Sanders, 1996; Dawson, 1994; Tate, 1994).   
Blacks and whites diverge on how they interact with the social system around 
them.  The most illuminating way in which middle and upper class blacks differ from 
middle and upper class whites is their belief that what happens to the black racial group 
as a whole affects what happens to them individually.  Blacks use racial group interest as 
a proxy for their own interests (Dawson, 2002; Dawson, 1994).  While whites may have 
other-oriented outlooks and may express a belief that what happens to others affects them 
personally (e.g., Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981) they do not substitute the group-based 
calculus for the individual calculus.  Blacks strategize their political and social actions 
based on a collective black identity.   
Despite the collective outlook on political and social life that distinguishes them 
from whites, blacks still engage in a diverse set of political actions and hold a varied set 
of political beliefs (Dawson, 2002).  In fact, the applied political lives of African 
Americans vary by neighborhood context (Oliver, 1999; Cohen and Dawson, 1993).  In 
particular, rates of political participation, levels of political efficacy, and access to socio-
political networks are systematically different across neighborhoods, even between poor 
and persistently poor neighborhoods.24
                                                 
24Marschall (2004) finds that there is no statistically significant relationship between the level of 
sociopolitical engagement in a neighborhood and how likely an individual living in that neighborhood is to 
attend a meeting about schools, contact officials about schools or talk to their friends about schools.  
Modifying Marschall’s models to specify the effects of neighborhood by race and class may produce results 
supportive of the current literature synthesis.   







The significance of race as a factor in African Americans’ lives (and by 
implication, in white Americans’ lives) impacts how blacks interact with the school 
system and how they are perceived by the school system.  The first implication is that 
blacks have developed the habitus of intervening for their children as a collective (Danns, 
2003; Shipps, 2003; Williams, 1989; Anderson, 1988; McCaul, 1987).  Exclusion based 
on race has meant that all claims for access had to delegitimize race as a barrier; 
reclaiming opportunity for the race was a significant part of any claim to access.  This 
also means that community actions are understood as substitutes for individual actions.  
The second implication of the persistent significance of race in African Americans’ lives 
for parent interactions with schools is that higher socioeconomic status for blacks does 
not send the same signal to educators that it sends for whites.  Blacks have limited 
potential for residential mobility and are overwhelmingly confined to racially distinct 
neighborhoods.  This means that the credibility of black parents’ threats to exit is low, 
reducing their leverage for commanding responsiveness from educators.  The third 
implication is that educators’ assessments of African American credibility are likely to 
vary by neighborhood affiliation.   
My findings in chapter three about the relationship between state legislation and 
African American student enrollment rates in GATE programs raises important questions 
about the mechanism for parity in education for black students: To what extent are 
educational outcomes a function of the rates at which parents participate in the education 
process and to what extent are they are function of the ways that educators respond to the 






Can the pattern of GATE enrollments be explained by citizen coproduction of gifted 
identification or do GATE enrollment patterns reflect educators’ responses to proprietary 
threat?   The combination of strategic educators, community intervention, and parents 
bound to their neighborhoods, suggests that GATE enrollments for African American 
students should vary by neighborhood and reflect more intensely educators’ assessments 
of proprietary threat than the participatory habits of African American parents. 
Coproduction and the Theory of Proprietary Threat 
 Coproduction refers to the provision of local services through the combined 
actions of citizens and governments.   It asserts that the provision of local services may 
be optimized through the conjoint actions of citizens and the government or service 
agencies responsible for policy outcomes. Coproduction is postulated in contrast to policy 
systems and type of implementation in which public officials have the exclusive 
responsibility for designing and providing services while citizens demand, consume, and 
evaluate the services (Brudney and England, 1983).  Coproduction refocuses the policy 
implementation and political participation literatures in three important ways.  It  (1) 
incorporates a broader range of behaviors into the realm of political participation; (2) 
highlights the importance of government institutions in recruiting citizen participation; 
and (3) focuses on participation at the implementation stage which widens our analytical 
lens to include the institutions and contexts within which people act (Marschall, 2004).   
 While the coproduction framework takes large strides toward specifying 
participatory behaviors at the policy implementation stage, its applicability to African 






definition throughout the literature. Each researcher contributing to the coproduction 
conversation adopts a definition that is relevant to the policy area being studied though 
doing so may expand or shrink the applicability of the concept to other policy areas.  This 
increases the difficulty of operationalizing the concept and restricts comparison of the 
effects of coproduction across policy domains.  The second detractor from the 
applicability of coproduction to African American politics is the underlying assumption 
that citizen participation elicits uniform responses from policy implementers.   Rather 
than assuming that citizen participation in the policy implementation stage is tantamount 
to cooperation between citizens and governments, a theory relevant to African American 
politics must capture the contingent nature of cooperation – specifying the conditions or 
actions that result in positive or improved policy outcomes.    
 Definitions of coproduction range from very broad designations (i.e., every 
interaction between citizens and policy implementers that results in policy outcomes) to 
rather restricted designations (e.g., only the activities between citizens and policy 
implementers that result in improved social conditions).  For example, Whitaker (1980) 
designates as coproduction the interactions between educators and students (because the 
production of education requires the engagement of students with teachers in the 
classroom) as well as activities in which citizen input does not seem critical (i.e., the 
distribution of water).  Sharp (1980) defines coproduced services as the “joint product of 
the activities of both citizens and government officials” which includes activities that 
create the physical conditions that lead to policy outcomes such as citizens choosing not 






 Brudney and England (1983) adopt a more restricted definition of coproduction:  
direct citizen involvement in the design and delivery of city services with professional 
service agents.  Their conceptualization has six components: (1) the degree of overlap 
between regular producers and consumers; (2) joint production of services by the two 
groups; (3) citizen involvement or participation rather than bureaucratic responsiveness; 
(4) activities that have positive rather than negative impacts on service delivery; (5) 
voluntary cooperation rather than compliance with laws; and (6) active roles, rather than 
passive behaviors.  Brudney and England generate a three-tier hierarchy of coproductive 
activities based on the type of goods produced -- individual, group, and collective.  At the 
individual level, they designate soft services like education and welfare as ‘captured 
coproduction’ because service recipients have little choice but to participate in the service 
and policy implementers  must follow policy, rules, and regulations subject to their 
discretion.  A second type of individual coproduction is exemplified by turning on fire 
alarms or picking up litter, activities that are tantamount to civic duty.  The benefits of 
these activities are largely personal and the overlap between producer and consumer 
spheres is small. 
 Brudney and England’s second tier of coproduction consists of activities whose 
benefits accrue to groups.  These activities serve two functions – to articulate and 
aggregate demand and  to pool resources.  They may require formal coordination 
mechanisms between service agents and citizen groups and consist of activities like 
neighborhood watches and neighborhood associations.  Brudney and England identify 






benefits to a select few, (2) the accrual of coproductive benefits to the most well-off, and 
(3) the potentially antagonistic relationship between policy implementers and consumer 
producers .  For example, city administrators may, at their discretion, resist working with 
non-professional citizens as partners and public employee unions may oppose 
implementation of service delivery that appears to threaten members’ livelihoods.  
Moreover, class, education, and race may affect who is willing or able to engage in 
coproductive activities and thereby exacerbate inequities (Rosentraub and Sharp, 1981, 
cited by Brudney and England). 
 Brudney and England’s final tier of coproductive activities is collective 
coproduction, which results in goods that can be enjoyed by the entire community.  They 
characterize these activities as the institutionalization of coproductive activities and 
assume the support of city officials and policy implementers.  Collective coproduction  
results in substantial overlap between producers and consumers. 
 Brudney and England’s explicit focus on citizen involvement and participation to 
the exclusion of bureaucratic responsiveness restricts from the coproduction framework 
the ability to theorize how implementer responses may vary with the characteristics of  
citizen-participants, thereby delimiting the ability to specify the effects of coproduction 
on policy outcomes.   Brudney and England are certainly aware that social identities (i.e., 
class, education, and race) may have an effect on participation and potential outcomes.  
Yet, because of their definitional choice,  outcome variation by race, for example, only 
results  from variances in  participation rates by racial group.  This is problematic for two 






coproducers at their discretion, they may stratify their responses based on the resources of 
participants, resulting in the stratification of outcomes by class, education, and race.  
Moreover, the nature of individual and collective action varies along class, education, and 
racial lines.  If policy implementers respond differentially to different types of 
coproductive actions, their responses and policy outcomes are likely to be stratified along 
class, education, and racial lines.  The effects of such strategic bureaucratic responses 
would manifest themselves in the outcomes of coproductive activities, but not as 
reflections of differential participation rates.  Thus their omission from the theoretical 
framework produces an incomplete picture of the dynamics of citizen participation at the 
policy implementation stage. 
 While Brudney and England touch on the potential tension between policy 
implementers and citizen coproducers, Rosentraub and Warren (1987) outline and 
classify the types of activities that policy implementers may find problematic in their 
relationships with citizen coproducers.  They distinguish between coproduction and other 
production-related activities – parallel production and ancillary actions.  Parallel 
production activities are “similar to those provided by public agencies but are produced 
by individuals without the cooperation of public agencies” such as hiring a tutor for one’s 
child, installing a burglar alarm, or hiring security guards for the apartment building one 
owns.  These acts contrast with the coproductive activities of working as a teacher’s aide 
or in the school library of one’s child.  Ancillary actions are those acts that when citizens 
fail to fulfill them lead to decreases in service levels.  Examples of these expected forms 






and Warren further differentiate between passive, active, and competitive actions.  While 
passive actions require no interaction with others, active actions require coordination or 
interaction with neighbors or service provides.  Competitive actions are operations in 
direct competition with the service provisions government agencies provide (i.e., hiring 
security guards).   
In their survey of police officers,  Rosentraub and Warren find that while the 
overwhelming majority of police officers (90%) agree or strongly agree with citizens 
taking ancillary production roles, they are less enthusiastic about parallel production and 
coproduction activities.  Over 70% of their survey respondents cannot decide whether 
they agree or disagree with citizens participating in parallel production activities.  
Evaluations of coproduction are inconclusive – about 41% agree or strongly agree with 
citizens engaging in coproduction activities while about 45% of them are uncertain.  
Moreover, while 65% of the police officers surveyed agree with citizens engaging in 
passive activities, more than 50% of them negatively evaluate citizen participation in 
competitive activities. 
 In the same vein as Brudney and England (ibid), Rosentraub and Warren (ibid) 
exclude potentially antagonistic activities from the core conceptualization of 
coproduction.  This reflects the orientation of the broader body of coproduction literature 
in specifying the participation side of the coproductive relationship (how citizens interact 
with policy implementers, the effects of citizens’ participation on their democratic 
outlooks, and the effectiveness of outcomes).  Yet Rosentraub and Warren’s continuum 






that the activities may elicit from policy implementers, thereby highlighting the need for 
a theory that includes both citizen participation and bureaucratic response to explain 
policy outcomes.  The theory of proprietary threat is such a theory.   
 The theory of proprietary threat posits that policy implementers who want to 
maintain their status as the primary experts in their fields will be preemptive in policy 
implementation when citizens are likely to engage in activities that copy and compete 
with their services (i.e., competitive and active production activities).  I refer to this 
preemptive policy implementation as ‘proprietary threat response.’  As the possibility of 
community advocates encroaching upon their autonomy increases, educators take 
preemptive actions to avoid interventions.  Thus, within the proprietary threat framework, 
merely publicizing the existence of a detailed policy that incorporates new African 
American participants into the gifted identification process gives teachers and 
administrators the incentive to consider more thoroughly African American students for 
GATE enrollment.  This incentive is even greater when students are affiliated with 
communities that are likely to intervene on their behalves.   
 The theory of proprietary threat is predicated on the idea that the ability of white 
and white middle-class parents to vote with their feet creates a credible threat to 
educators that encourages educators to preemptively implement policies to meet parents’ 
preferences (Lowery, 1998; Hirschman, 1970).25
                                                 
25 The theory of proprietary threat owes much to Hirschman’s discussion of credible threat in Exit, Voice, 
and Loyalty.  While providing a rich conceptual tool, Hirschman’s discussion was not oriented toward 
empirical analysis, i.e. there were no mechanisms for prediction.  The theory of  proprietary threat lends 
itself to predictive scrutiny.    
  To avoid the sanction of exit and the 






the implicit requests of mobile parents: placing their children in upper level classes, 
assigning them to the best teachers, and making the best schools available to them.   
 At the same time, educators’ assessment of threat credibility from African 
American parents primarily rests on the level of political empowerment of African 
Americans because of the relative immobility of African Americans and the well-known 
prevalence of relatively poor education offerings for African American students (which 
suppresses the idea that moving to a different district will actually result in better 
outcomes).  The political empowerment of African Americans conveys African 
Americans’ ability to levy connections with officials who can pressure educators into 
offering the opportunities and services that they prefer.  When political structures 
incorporate African Americans into the education process, they institutionalize the idea 
that political officials can be held accountable for the attainment of African American 
education preferences -- to the extent that this is electorally feasible – and the possibility 
that politicians will use their influence with educators to secure the preferences of the 
African American community.  
 In the absence of political structures that incorporate African Americans or in the 
presence of political structures that disempower African Americans, African Americans 
are assessed as non-credible interveners.  When African Americans are assessed as non-
credible interveners, educators are more willing to risk sanction from African American 
parents than white parents.  They therefore rank the preferences of African American 






goods like upper level placements and assignment to the best teachers and schools to 
white students instead of African American students. 
 As it relates to gifted education, proprietary threat response refers to heavily 
weighting an estimate of parent intervention to determine GATE placement.  For students 
whose whiteness associates them with residential mobility, this proxy is presumed socio-
economic status.  In places where the accountability regimes politically incorporate a 
class of parents by deputizing them as policy monitors through the adoption of 
participatory clauses, the proxy in use is the strength of political organization associated 
with that student.   
I test the theory of proprietary threat against the coproduction framework by 
examining enrollment in gifted and talented education programs in Chicago, where the 
Local School Councils system is an archetype of a state-legislated coproduction policy 
that creates an environment conducive to proprietary threat response to African 
Americans.  Chicago’s Local School Councils (LSC) are small governance bodies 
composed of parent and community representatives whose tasks are to design school 
budgets and school reforms, monitor school improvement, and monitor the effectiveness 
of principals (Hess, 1991).  Adoption of the LSC system established at each Chicago 
school a locally-elected council which would advocate for improved student outcomes.  
Chicago’s LSC policy produces the conditions for proprietary threat response.  The 
policy gives the public the opportunity to diminish the proprietary integrity of educators 
if they choose to do so and raises the credibility of threat associated with African 






the public with the opportunity to interrogate, redefine, and reject educators’ definition of 
giftedness.  The LSC policy is also an archetype of coproductive relationships.  The 
public is invited to share in the administration of policy.  And if the public fails to do so, 
then the quality of policy implementation diminishes.  If the Local School Councils fail 
to meet, plan, and monitor outcomes, then educational outcomes will be suboptimal. 
A central corollary of the theory of proprietary threat is that educational 
opportunities are distributed based on differential educator responses to parent and 
neighborhood attributes.   The implications are as follows.  Outside of a governance 
environment that induces proprietary threat response to blacks, white and black students 
will be enrolled in GATE disproportionately, with enrollment biased towards white 
students as educators will be more responsive to those who can threaten them credibly 
than those who threaten without credibility.  Parent advocacy will be less successful for 
blacks than it is for whites so that even when black parents and the black community are 
engaged in intervention activities, fewer blacks than whites will be enrolled in GATE 
than predicted by academic ability.  Within a governance environment that induces 
proprietary threat response for blacks, black and white enrollments will be similar.  The 
racial difference in enrollments will disappear, controlling for all other relevant factors.  
Community political engagement will be a significant factor for black students’ 
enrollment.  Its impact on enrollment for black students will be as strong as parent 
socioeconomic status for white students outside of the governance-induced threat 
environment.   As with non-threat environments, enrollments will more closely reflect 






enrolled who have lower academic scores and higher associated threat than a cadre of 
students who have higher academic scores and lower associated threat and are not 
enrolled. 
Based on these implications of the theory of proprietary threat, I test the following 
hypotheses:   
 
Hypothesis 1:  GATE enrollment will be more closely aligned with the credibility 
of threat from parents and communities than it will be with 
academic qualifications.  Some enrollees will have lower 
academic qualifications than some non-enrollees. These enrollees 
will be associated with adults with higher threat credibility than 
the adults associated with the non-enrollees with higher 
academic qualifications. 
 
H 1a: The average parent threat credibility for enrollees with low 
IQ test scores will be higher than the average parent threat 
credibility for non-enrollees with high IQ test scores. 
 
H 1b: The average community threat credibility for enrollees with 
low IQ test scores will be higher than the average parent 
threat credibility for non-enrollees with high IQ test scores. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  Educators will be responsive to the black community. 
 
H 2a:  Race will not be a significant predictor of enrollment in the 
government-induced threat environment. 
 
H 2b: The probability of enrollment will increase with increased 
levels of parent participation in the education process.   
 
H 2c: The probability of enrollment will increase with increased 
levels of neighborhood participation in the education 
process.   
 
Hypothesis 3:   Black student enrollment will vary with the level of threat 
associated with the student.   
 
H 3a: The probability of enrollment will increase with increased 







H 3b: The probability of enrollment will increase with increased 
levels of neighborhood political engagement.  
 
H 3c: Threat from parents and community members is 
interchangeable for black students who live in majority- 
and predominantly- minority neighborhoods. 
 
Data, Methodology, and Models 
 
Data and Measures 
 
The data for this analysis are from the Project on Human Development in Chicago 
Neighborhoods (PHDCN), a longitudinal research project housed with the National 
Archives of Criminal Justice Data at the University of Michigan. 26
Survey participants were selected using stratified probability sampling.  The 
initial sampling unit was the ‘neighborhood’ – geographical areas constructed to capture 
the boundaries of local political culture, economic exchange, and daily interaction.  The 
neighborhood units are loosely aligned with U.S. Census tracts.  I use data from the first 
wave of the study and examine responses for youth aged 6 – 17 and their primary 
   The PHDCN is a 
three-wave study of Chicago youth, their parents, and their neighborhoods.  The PHDCN 
is the best available existing dataset on which to conduct a test of the theory of 
proprietary threat.  It is the only publicly available dataset that includes extensive 
information on youth in multiple age cohorts, student enrollment in gifted and talented 
education programs, measures of academic qualifications for enrollment, parent 
participation in the education process, and the behavior and attitudes of individuals 
within neighborhoods.   
                                                 
26 Earls, Felton J., Jeanne Brooks-Gunn, Stephen W. Raudenbush, and Robert J. Sampson.  Project on 
Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN).  Boston, MA: Harvard Medical School 






caregivers (N = 2,978).   The sample includes white youth (N = 433, 14.5% of the 
sample), black youth (N = 1001, 33.4% of the sample), and Hispanic youth (N = 1451, 
48.7% of the sample).27  In addition to the survey of youth and their parents, a 
community survey was administered to 8,782 residents of the 80 Chicago neighborhoods 
in which these youth reside.28  I use responses to the community survey to construct a 
picture of the neighborhoods and to assess the effects of the neighborhood on outcomes.  
The initial wave of the PHDCN survey was administered after the implementation of the 
Local School Councils system and so it affords the opportunity to quantify the effects of 
parent and community participation in education and to examine the effects of proprietary 
threat.29
The dependent variable in this analysis is whether or not a child has ever been 
enrolled in a gifted and talented education program.  I use the logistic function in 
hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) to examine how the characteristics of students, their 
families, and their neighbors affect students’ chances for enrollment in a gifted and 
talented education program.  The child-level equation includes measures of the 
respondent’s academic ability (score on the WISC vocabulary test, i.e. IQ Test Score); 
potential barriers to identification (race, ethnicity and English language primacy); and 
   
                                                 
27 The remaining 3.4% of the sample is comprised of youth identified as Asian/Pacific Islander, Native 
American, and other.  Youth of all racial and ethnic backgrounds are included in the analysis to prevent the 
loss of neighborhood-level data due to insufficient sample size.  See further discussion in the methodology 
appendix. 
28 One neighborhood was completely dropped from this analysis so that for the neighborhood sample, 
N=79. 
29 The optimal data on which to test the theory of proprietary threat would be a panel study or a longitudinal 
cross-sectional dataset in which different waves of the data were collected prior to and after the 
implementation of the LSC policy, creating a natural experiment.  This is not a feature of the PHDCN 
dataset but to capitalize on these characteristics of the PHDCN dataset discussed in the text, I forgo the 
benefits of a natural experiment.  The theory of proprietary threat will be subjected to a test on longitudinal 






parent participation in education.30
Measuring credible threat 
  The neighborhood context is captured by racial and 
ethnic composition, socioeconomic status – an aggregated composite measure of income, 
level of education, and occupational prestige, and community advocacy.  Community 
advocacy captures the probability that a neighbor would become involved in the 
education of the respondent.   It relays how frequently the adults in a neighborhood assist 
each other with children and how frequently they advise each other on child-related 
issues.     
 
 The central claim of the theory of proprietary threat is that educators use publicly 
available shortcuts such as socioeconomic status and neighborhood political engagement 
to ascertain the extent to which a parent or community member can sanction the district 
with exit, dissolution of the district, and proprietary infringement.  Use of parent 
socioeconomic status as a proxy for threat presents a particularly novel problem as most 
researchers use a measure of socioeconomic status as a demand-side variable to proxy for 
parents’ actual participation in education (Rothstein, 2004; Hess and Leal, 200l; Crozier, 
2000).  The argument is that class and class-based habitus dictates the extent to which a 
parent will feel comfortable interacting with educators and thus whether or not they 
pursue interaction.  The extensive nature of the PHDCN dataset allows me to measure 
directly the extent of a parents’ involvement in education.  Including a direct measure of 
parent involvement in the analysis allows for socioeconomic status to be theorized as a 
                                                 
30 I use the term advocacy to refer to participation in education.  Thus, parent advocacy is used 
interchangeably with parent participation in education and community advocacy is used interchangeably 






supply-side variable and interpreted as the credibility of threat.  The measure of 
socioeconomic status used in this analysis is a composite measure of occupational 
prestige, education and income.31
Just less than ten-percent of the student sample (287) has been enrolled in a gifted 
program.  A summary of the differences between enrollees and non-enrollees can be 
found in Table 4.1.  GATE enrollees score significantly higher on the WISC test than do 
non-enrollees (.54 vs. -.06 on the standardized scale).  The parents of enrollees attend 
parent-teacher conferences more frequently than the parents of non-enrollees.  The 
neighborhood constructs indicate the percentage of neighborhood adults who perform 
certain acts more than the average city resident.  Table 4.1 indicates that on average, 
61.6% of the adults in gifted students’ neighborhoods exchange ideas on child issues 
more frequently than the average city resident.  There is a higher level of threat 
credibility associated with the parents of enrolled students, but no significant difference 
in the level of threat associated with their neighborhoods. Finally, just over thirty-two 
percent of the students live in a predominantly-minority neighborhood, which is defined 
as 70% African American or 70% Hispanic.   
  I use a measure of neighborhood activism as a measure 
of threat credibility at the neighborhood level.  It is an aggregate measure of participation 
in neighborhood organizations such as community councils, local political organizations, 
and neighborhood watch programs.  
                                                 
31 Unless explicitly noted, the composite measures and indices used in the analysis were created by the 







Table 4.1  Characteristics of Enrolled and Never-Enrolled Students 
 
Enrolled in gifted 
program 
(SD) 
Never enrolled in 
gifted program 
(SD) 
Student characteristics   






Family characteristics   
Parent advocacy 2.37*** (.919) 
2.08*** 
(1.06) 
Neighborhood characteristics    
Neighborhood SES, % greater 





Exchange on child issues, % 





Credibility of threat   
Family SES, composite  .489*** (1.02) 
-.062*** 
(.992) 
Neighborhood activism, % 





Sample size N = 287 N = 2691 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, ~p<.1 
 
Analytical techniques 
Hierarchical linear modeling is used to analyze the PHDCN dataset. Hierarchical 
linear modeling (HLM) is a statistical technique that allows more accurate modeling of 
the variance for nested data elements than would be estimated with techniques that treat 
these data as independent of each other.32
                                                 
32 Raudenbush, Stephen W. and Bryk, Anthony S.  (2002)  Hierarchical Linear Models: Applications and Data Analysis 
Methods. (Second Edition)  Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.   
 HLM facilitates modeling multiple units of 
analysis simultaneously.  Modeling one unit of analysis at a time overemphasizes the 
importance of that unit on the outcomes being studied and under-theorizes the 
mechanisms between levels of analysis.  This analytical technique allows me to test 






simultaneously measuring the effects of individual contributors to enrollment like 
intelligence and parent involvement in education.  
HLM in this analysis involves two meaningful steps.33
                                                 
33 Generally, three steps are involved in hierarchical linear modeling – partitioning of the variance, 
estimation of the effects at the individual-level (students and parents), and estimation of effects at the 
group-level (neighborhoods).  The first step involves partitioning the variance in the outcome into within- 
neighborhood and between-neighborhood components.   For example, HLM would allow me to estimate 
the proportion of the variation in GATE enrollment that occurs because of differences between students 
who live within a neighborhood and the proportion of variation that occurs because of differences between 
neighborhoods.  Partitioning the variance would allow me to understand how much of the variation in 
enrollment could be explained by neighborhood factors as only the between-neighborhood component of 
the variance can be modeled as a function of neighborhood factors.  However, this step is not appropriate 
for the current analysis because the outcome measure is dichotomous.  The variance for a binomial variable 
is equal to 
    In the first step I 
estimate the relationships between academic and personal background factors and the 
probability that a student will be enrolled in GATE within each neighborhood.  At this 
level I must decide whether the independent variables must be measured as fixed effects 
or random effects.  In the analyses presented here, all independent variables at the 
individual-level are estimated as fixed effects.  That means that the between-
neighborhood variances of their relationships to the outcome are fixed to zero (e.g., all 
slopes were kept constant across neighborhoods).  I was quite interested in estimating at 
least one of these relationships – the slope of parent SES (or parent threat credibility) on 
GATE enrollment as a random effect.  However, I found that this relationship did not 
vary systematically across neighborhoods.  In the second step, I estimate the relationships 
between neighborhood characteristics and the probability that a student will be enrolled 
in GATE.  I discuss the results of these analyses together and present them as one model 




, where )|1(Pr( BY = ,which is not constant and is not independent from the mean.  








 The first hypothesis I test is that enrollment in gifted and talented education 
programs will be more closely aligned with the credibility of threat from parents and 
communities than it will be with academic qualifications.  This hypothesis implies that 
there are GATE enrollees who are not academically qualified for the program but who 
gain entrance based on the credibility of threat generated by their parents and their 
neighbors. It also implies the existence of students who, despite test scores suggesting 
that they merit enrollment, are not enrolled.   These non-enrolled students are theorized to 
be associated with parents and neighbors with low threat credibility.  I test this hypothesis 
by comparing the average level of threat credibility associated with enrollees scoring in 
the bottom 30% of the sample on the IQ test to the threat credibility associated with non-
enrollees scoring in the top 30% of the sample on the IQ test.34
  
   
Table 4.2  Threat Credibility Comparison for High IQ Non-Enrollees and Low IQ Enrollees 
 Average parent threat 
credibility 
Average community threat 
credibility 
Enrollees with low IQ test scores  
(N = 133) 
.886 
[.732   1.04] 
44.0 
[42.62   44.39] 
Non-enrollees with high IQ test scores 
(N = 940) 
-.370 
[-.423   -.317] 
41.9 
[41.16   42.67] 
[ ] represents the 95% confidence interval  
 
 As predicted by the theory of proprietary threat,  parent threat credibility for 
enrollees with low IQ test scores is higher than parent threat credibility for non-enrollees 
with high IQ test scores.  The average level of parent threat credibility for enrollees with 
                                                 
34 Comparisons of enrollees in the 20th percentile and 80th percentile and in the 10th and 90th percentile 






low IQ test scores is .89 standard deviations above the mean whereas the average level of 
parent threat credibility for non-enrollees with high IQ test scores is .37 below the mean.  
This pattern of association between threat credibility and enrollment also exists for 
community threat credibility, though the contrast in the level of threat credibility is not as 
striking.  At forty-four percent, the average community threat credibility for enrollees 
with low IQ test scores is higher than the average community threat credibility for non-
enrollees with high IQ test scores which is just under forty-two percent. These results 
support the theory of proprietary threat and suggest further investigation.  See Table 4.2. 
HLM Conditional model 
 
I hypothesize that at the student-level higher enrollment probabilities will be 
associated with higher IQ scores, English language primacy, higher levels of parent 
participation in education, and higher levels of threat credibility.  I hypothesize a 
“contextual” effect at the neighborhood level such that higher levels of neighborhood 
advocacy and threat credibility will be associated with increased enrollment probabilities.  
The theory of proprietary threat implies that community threat credibility has a distinctive 
impact on African American enrollment and I test this hypothesis by modeling 
community threat credibility on β3, the African American slope.  The theory of 
proprietary threat also implies that response to parent advocacy varies by neighborhood.  
It suggests that there is a distinctive relationship between parent advocacy and enrollment 
in predominantly-minority neighborhoods and that community threat credibility alters the 






modeling community threat credibility and whether or not the students resided in a 
predominantly-minority neighborhood on slope β6, the parent advocacy slope.    
The fully specified model is  
 
η = β0 + β1 (Intelligence) + β2 (Parent threat credibility) + β3 (African 
American) + β4 (Hispanic) + β5 (Primary language is Spanish) + β6 
(Parent advocacy) 
β0 = γ00 + γ01(Community advocacy) + γ02(Community threat credibility) + 
u0 
β1 = γ1  
β2 = γ2  
β3 = γ30 + γ31(Community threat credibility)  
β4 = γ40 + γ41(Predominantly-minority neighborhood) 
β5 = γ50  




ηij = γ00 + γ01(Community Advocacy) + γ02(Parent threat credibility) + 
γ10(Intelligence) + γ20(SES)  +  γ30(African American) + 
γ31(Community threat credibility* African American) +  
γ40(Hispanic) +  γ41(Predominantly-minority neighborhood * 
Hispanic) + γ50(Spanish as primary language) + γ60(Parent 
Advocacy) + γ61(Predominantly-minority neighborhood * Parent 
advocacy) + γ62(Parent threat credibility * Parent advocacy) + u0j.   
 
The intercept, β0, is modeled as a function of neighborhood attributes so that there is a 
random variance component.  The remaining coefficients are modeled with fixed 
variance. Community advocacy and community threat credibility are modeled on the 
intercept so that they change the average odds of enrollment for students residing in a 

















Intercept     
Intercept G00 -3.33*** (.552) 0.036 -- -- 
Community advocacy, G01 0.025** (.007) 1.03 13.54 1.40 
Community threat, G02  -0.018* (.010) 0.983 11.61 0.816 
IQ slope 
  Intercept, G10  0.444*** (.078) 1.56 1.00 1.56 
Parent threat slope 





(.977) 0.192 -- -- 
Community threat, G31   0.047* (.022) 1.05 11.61 1.71 
Hispanic slope 




(.861) 0.180 0.46 0.455 
Spanish slope 
Intercept, G50  -1.09** (.495) 0.337 -- -- 
Parent advocacy slope     
Intercept, G60 0.735* (.318) 2.09 1.05 2.165 
High minority 
neighborhood, G61  
0.362* 
(.179) 1.44 0.46 1 
Community threat, G62  -0.018** (.006) 0.982 11.61 0.815 
     





Intercept 1, u0j 0.384 0.147** 104.8 0.016 
FUM τ00 = 0.311     
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, ~p<.1 
 
                                                 
35 The coefficient for intercept G30 is considered insignificant for the computations used to describe this 
model.  This coefficient is not statistically significant when the model is estimated with robust standard 






The results of this analysis support the hypotheses that educators are responsive to 
the black community and that black student enrollment varies with the threat level 
associated with the student.  Parent participation in the education process is significantly 
correlated with enrollment in gifted and talented education.  However, the influence of 
parent participation on GATE enrollment does not completely explain the difference 
between the probabilities of enrollment for black and white students.  Race remains a 
significant predictor of enrollment in GATE; yet it matters in a way that supports the 
theory of proprietary threat.   Community threat credibility operates differently for black 
students and students who are not black.  It is a stronger predictor of enrollment for black 
students than it is for other students.   
The intercept parameter estimates the odds of enrollment for a non-black student 
of average intelligence living in a neighborhood with typical levels of community 
advocacy and community threat credibility – that is, the city-wide average -- while 
controlling for the effects of ethnicity, primary language, parent advocacy, and family 
SES.  The predicted probability of enrollment for this student is 0.03.  The odds of 
enrollment for such a student increase by 56% with each standard deviation increase in 
IQ test score, so that the predicted probability of enrollment is 0.05 for a similarly 
situated student with an IQ test score one standard deviation above the mean and it is 
0.08 for a similarly situated student with an IQ test score two standard deviations above 
the mean.   
 Parent advocacy and community advocacy are positively related to the odds of 






ethnicity and language, the predicted probability of enrollment for a student with an IQ 
test score two standard deviations above the mean and family threat credibility at the 
sample mean, the predicted probability of enrollment increases from 0.08 to 0.44 as 





Figure 4.1 Impact of Parent Advocacy on Enrollment 
 
 The odds of enrollment also vary with the characteristics of students’ 
neighborhoods.  Higher levels of community advocacy are positively related to the odds 
of enrollment.  Community advocacy increases the probability of enrollment dramatically 
-- from 0.08 at the city-wide neighborhood average to 0.42 at two standard deviations 
                                                 
36 The remainder of the model description will discuss the odds of enrollment for a student with IQ scores 
two standard deviations above the sample mean and family socioeconomic status (family threat credibility) 
equal to the sample mean, unless otherwise specified.   
37 For all graphs, the predictors not in the graph are held constant at their means and the fixed effects 
modeled are Laplace estimates for the unit-specific model.  The graphs are not meant to show general 
trends as the odds of enrollment are not constant.  Instead, the graphs are presented to facilitate comparison 
across the independent variables just as the descriptions of the model are presented to facilitate insight into 






above average.  A one-percent increase over the city-wide neighborhood average in the 
number of residents who exchange ideas about children results in a 2.5% increase in the 
odds of enrollment.  That is, students who live in neighborhoods where more adults  
participate in the education process and are more likely to advocate on behalf of students 
have higher odds of enrollment than do students who live where community advocacy is 
less likely.  See Figure 4.2.   
 
Figure 4.2 Impact of Community Advocacy on Enrollment 
 
The probability of program enrollment is also correlated with the concentration of 
minority residents in a neighborhood.  In neighborhoods where at least 70% of the 
residents are African American or Hispanic, parent advocacy is a particularly effective 
mechanism for increasing the odds of enrollment. In these neighborhoods, the slope for 
the effects of parent advocacy on enrollment increases by 36%.  The probability of 
enrollment for a student who lives in a neighborhood with an average level of community 






to 0.79 if the student moves from a typical neighborhood to a predominantly minority 
neighborhood.   
Parent advocacy and community advocacy are not interchangeable for youth who 
live in predominantly-minority neighborhoods.  The probability of enrollment increases 
from .08 to .48 as the probability of community advocacy increases from the city-wide 
average to the maximum.  The impact of parent advocacy is much stronger as its slope 
increases by 36% in predominantly-minority neighborhoods.  In these neighborhoods, the 
probability of enrollment increases from .08 to .70 as the probability of parent advocacy 
increases from its minimum to its maximum.  Surprisingly, there is no correlation 
between the socioeconomic status of a neighborhood and the odds of enrollment when 
controlling for other neighborhood and student characteristics.  The relative effectiveness 
of parent and community advocacy for enrolling students in gifted education in 
impoverished neighborhoods mirrors their effectiveness in relatively wealthy 
neighborhoods.38
Threat credibility and the probability of enrollment 
 
 
The odds of enrollment increase by 29% for each standard deviation increase in 
family socioeconomic status, that is, for each standard deviation increase in the 
credibility of threat from parents.  Holding constant all neighborhood characteristics and 
controlling for ethnicity and language, the predicted probability of enrollment for a 
student with an IQ test score two standard deviations above the mean is 0.06 if parent 
                                                 
38 The variable for the average socioeconomic status of neighborhood residents was included in analyses 







threat credibility is one standard deviation below the mean and increases to 0.13 as parent 
threat credibility increases to two standard deviations above the mean.  
 
 
Figure 4.3 Impact of Parent Threat Credibility on Enrollment 
 
Controlling for race, higher levels of community threat credibility decrease the 
probability of enrollment.  A one percent increase in community threat credibility reduces 
the odds of enrollment for a typical student by 1.8%.  It also decreases the effectiveness 
of parent advocacy.  In each neighborhood with a standard deviation increase in the level 
of community threat credibility, the slope for the effects of parent advocacy on 
enrollment is reduced by 21%. On the other hand, community threat credibility increases 
the odds of enrollment for African American students by 5%.  This means that the odds 
of enrollment increase by 73% for an African American student who moves into a 
neighborhood where the level of community threat credibility is a one standard deviation 








Figure 4.4 Joint Impact of Community Threat Credibility and Parent Advocacy on Enrollment 
 
  
Figure 4.5 Impact of Community Threat Credibility for African American Students 
 
Community threat credibility is not a stronger correlate of enrollment than are the 
combined effects of parent and community advocacy.  For non-African American 






unit increase in the level of community credibility reduces the slope of parent advocacy 
by 2%.  Community threat credibility is neither a stronger predictor of enrollment than 
parent or community advocacy, nor does it enhance the probability of enrollment. 
The effects of community threat credibility are different for African American 
students.  Community threat credibility is beneficial for African American students in the 
absence of parent advocacy.   When the probability of community advocacy is held 
constant at the city-wide average, community threat credibility increases the probability 
of enrollment for African American students from .08 to .39 as it ranges from its 
minimum to its maximum.  If community advocacy simultaneously increases with 
community threat credibility from the sample average to two standard deviations above 
it, the probability of enrollment for African American students increases from .56 to .84.   
Yet, even for African American students, community advocacy has a higher 
potential impact on enrollment than does community threat credibility.39
 
  Moreover, in 
predominantly-minority neighborhoods, high levels of community advocacy in the 
absence of community threat credibility increase the odds of enrollment more than 
community threat credibility in the absence of community advocacy.  A strong two-prong 
advocacy strategy (parents and communities), employed when community threat 
credibility is minimal, increases the probability of enrollment in gifted education more 
than does community threat credibility in conjunction with community advocacy. 
 
 
                                                 
39 Recall that increases in the probability of community advocacy from the sample average to two standard 






Conclusions and research trajectory 
 
 Accountability regimes – that is, the formally adopted set of regulatory 
relationships between federal, state, and local governments – are policy systems that 
codify political control.  Accountability regimes in education establish mandates for 
school district responsiveness to higher levels of government and to parents (Scheurich 
and Skrla, 2004).  These systems rest on the dual pillars of government sanction for poor 
performance and parents’ abilities to vote with their feet by moving to schools or districts 
that perform better (Lowery, 1998).  Moreover, at the most fundamental level, these 
systems empower parents to hold all levels of government responsible for educational 
outcomes.  But some parents are not able to take full advantage of the benefits of 
accountability systems because they are captured constituents – confined to their 
neighborhood schools because they do not have the resources to move or transport their 
children to better performing schools.  Thus, without some other way to enforce the 
mechanism for parent involvement in education, captured constituents must rely solely on 
the effectiveness of performance sanctions to enhance the quality of education for their 
children (Shipps, 2003).   
This presents a particularly drastic dilemma for the African American community 
whose involvement in education historically has been resisted (Danns, 2003; Shipps, 
2003; Lareau, 1989; Williams, 1989; Ford, 1994) and who more than any other group of 
Americans fall within the captured constituent category (Noguera, 2002; Henig et al, 
1999).  While the African American community has consistently pursued quality 






1988), their claims have been just as consistently diminished, overlooked, and ignored, or 
response has been delayed in response to the political climate and administrator 
resistance to external claims about resources and procedures (Guinier, 2004).  Given the 
historically antagonistic relationship between African Americans and school districts, the 
effectiveness of an accountability regime for the African American community relies on 
the ability of the regime to provoke district responsiveness to the African American 
community -- that is, to compensate for the political exclusion of African Americans 
from education policy-making.    
In this chapter, I have argued that the participatory clauses in legislation about 
gifted and talented education establish the political inclusion of African Americans by 
codifying the conditions that elicit proprietary threat response from educators.  
Proprietary threat response refers to the strategic and preemptive implementation of 
policy by policy implementers when facing the potential scrutiny of external actors 
whose involvement implicitly sanctions their performance.  In the realm of gifted and 
talented education, it refers to the enrollment of students in gifted and talented programs 
based on the credibility of their parents’ or community advocates’ underlying threat to 
exit from the school system  if their voices are not heard in the identification process.  
Because of the relative immobility of African American families and political neglect, 
school districts are generally immune to their threats of exit, resulting in enrollment rates 
biased against African American students.  The adoption of parent and community 
participatory clauses counterbalances the immobility of African American constituents, 






institutionalizes incentives for school districts to be responsive to African American 
claims.   
 The analysis in this chapter suggests that captured constituent access to public 
resources is facilitated by environments that induce proprietary threat on their behalves.    
In Chicago, where the credibility of black parent and community threats to sanction the 
school district are reinforced by the state-constructed Local School Councils system, 
GATE enrollments reflect the level of threat associated with a student more closely than 
they reflect academic potential. Parent advocacy is as strongly correlated with enrollment 
in gifted and talented education programs for black students as it is for non-black 
students.  Moreover, the credibility of threat from parents and community members is 
positively correlated with black student enrollment.   
While this analysis provides support for the theory of  proprietary threat, its reach 
is limited and further investigation of the theory is necessary.  One way to continue 
investigation of the theory of proprietary threat would be to test it through time series 
analysis in one locale, covering periods prior to and after the adoption of a participatory 
clause for gifted education.  In the ideal case, the analysis would have a regression 
discontinuity design that would facilitate analysis of data from the cohorts identified just 
prior to and just after the adoption of accountability policies with participatory clauses.  
Recall that a central premise of this theory is that the African American community is 
already poised to intervene on behalf of African American students; their ability to 
achieve policy equality requires the adoption of a mechanism to make educators 






that contain information on students and parents at the individual level also contain 
information on the political behavior of parents and community members.  With the 
exception of the PHDCN dataset, these sources do not include information on gifted and 
talented enrollment.  These facts suggest that use of an existing dataset would focus on an 
alternative area of education.  Analyses of the theory of proprietary threat conducted in 
other areas of education will be richer the closer they are able to replicate the 
characteristics of gifted education that make it a great site to examine proprietary threat 
response.40
 An alternative method of exploring the theory of proprietary threat as political 
incorporation is to examine nation-wide cross-sectional data of gifted enrollment 
covering various accountability regimes.  Given the lack of individual data on gifted 
students at the national level, this analysis would focus primarily on system-wide 
measures of enrollment.   
   
                                                 
40 Enrollment in gifted and talented education programs is a useful site for understanding the nature of 
proprietary threat response because gifted education is one of the least standardized areas of public 
education.  The lack of standardization applies to standards for identification, curriculum, and expected 
outcomes.  Action to provide consistent programming within states is recent and is in most places in the 
process of being implemented.   The contested nature of gifted identification also makes it a fertile place to 
explore proprietary threat response.  All U.S. states allow for the identification of students based on 
multiple criteria, one of which is teacher recommendation.  The subjectivity of this and other identification 
criteria, along with the various interpretations of intelligence tests, leaves much room for public discourse 
about who should be enrolled in the programs.  Furthermore, the added level of professional training 








Chapter 4 Appendix 
 
 Part A of this appendix contains the question wording for variables used in the 
HLM model.  Part B presents a specification of the student-level model without the 





Enrollment in gifted and talented education 
Many students receive special teaching or help in school.  As any point since [student] 
started his/her education has s/he received any help or special teaching in any of the 
following areas? 
 
Coded yes = 1 and no = 0 
 
IQ Test score 
 
Standardized score on the WISC vocabulary test.  Raw scores for both English and 
Spanish tests were scaled by English norms. 
 
English/Spanish language primacy 
 
Coded 1 if the IQ test was administered in Spanish; coded 0 if the IQ test was 
administered in English. 
 
The following variables operationalize family social class in the model.  Educational 
enrichment had a statistically insignificant relationship with enrollment in gifted and 
talented education programs and was dropped from the model. 
 
Parent advocacy  
 
How often do you attend scheduled parent/teacher conferences?  
1.almost always;  2. often;  3. seldom;  4. never 
 
The value of parent advocacy was recoded as an increasing scale in which never was 












Is [student] routinely involved in extracurricular activities directly connected with his/her 
school such as school sports teams, school clubs, music groups, etc.  If yes, what kind of 
program is this?  (Circle all that apply) 
 
1. Recreational (sports, games, crafts); 2. Artistic (music, dance, art); 3. Academic 
enrichment (tutoring, classes); 4.Other (please specify) 
 
Is [student] involved in any other kind of after school program? (This may be at 
[student’s] school, but is more of an after school program rather than extracurricular 
activity.)  If yes, what kind of program is this?  (Circle all that apply) 
1. Recreational (sports, games, crafts); 2. Artistic (music, dance, art); 3. Academic 
enrichment (tutoring, classes); 4.Other (please specify) 
 
The value of the educational enrichment variable was coded as 1 if the respondent 
answered academic enrichment (tutoring, classes) to either of these questions. 
 
 
The following variables are used to operationalize neighborhood influence in the 
education process.  Neighborhood socioeconomic status had a statistically insignificant 
relationship with enrollment in gifted and talented education programs and was dropped 
from the model. 
 
 
To create the neighborhood variables, I created a variable that indicated the percentage of 
neighborhood residents who responded that they engaged in the activity more frequently 
than the average community survey respondent.  
 
Neighborhood socioeconomic status 
 




How often do you and people in your neighborhood do favors (such as watching each 
other’s children, helping with shopping, lending garden or house tools, and other small 
acts of kindness) for each other? 
 
How often do you and other people in the neighborhood ask each other advice about 
personal things such as child rearing or job openings? 
 







The scale score is the adjusted mean scale score (mean over the scale items and adjusted 




Coded yes = 1 if the neighborhood population is 70% or more African American or 70% 
or more Hispanic. 
 





Parent threat is operationalized as a composite measure of socioeconomic status 
including parent’s income, education level, and occupational prestige.   
 
Salary is the maximum of total personal income and total household income reported by 
the respondent (2a and b) 
From the sources of income AND the income from any jobs you had in the last tax year, 
what was your total income before taxes in the last year, using these choices? 
 
From these choices, what was your total household income in the last tax year before 
taxes?  Household income includes your income and any income coming in from anyone 
else in the household. 
 
1. less than $5,000; 2. between $5,000 and $9,999; 3. between $10,000 and $19,999; 4. 
between $20,000 and $29,999; 5. between $30,000 and $39,999; 6. between $40,000 and 
$49,999; 7. more than $50,000; 8. don’t know 
 
Education is measured as the maximum level of education for the primary caregiver or 
the partner of the primary caregiver.  The categories of measurement are some high 
school, finished high school, some education more than high school, and bachelor’s 




Is the religious organization [to which the respondent belongs] in the neighborhood? 
Does the neighborhood watch program hold meetings in this neighborhood?  
Are block group meetings held in the neighborhood? 
Are business or civic group meetings held in the neighborhood? 
Are ethnicity or nationality club meetings or social functions held in the neighborhood? 
Do you (or any household members) belong to a neighborhood Ward Group, or other 








Coded as yes = 1 and no = 0. 
The scale score is the adjusted mean scale score (mean over the scale items and adjusted 
for missing data). 
  
Chapter 4 Appendix Table 3  Threat Credibility Comparison for High IQ Non-Enrollees and Low IQ 
Enrollees 
 Average parent threat 
credibility 
Average community threat 
credibility 
 
Enrollees  in the 10th percentile  
(N = 50) 
1.02 
[.765   1.28] 
44.1 
[41.0   47.2] 
Non-enrollees in the 90th percentile  
(N = 22) 
-.491 
[-.568  -.414] 
42.4 
[41.2  43.6] 
 
Enrollees in the 20th percentile  
(N = 100) 
.930 
[.746   1.11] 
42.9 
[40.6   45.2] 
Non-enrollees in the 80th percentile  
(N = 597) 
-.456 
[-.522   -.395] 
42.2 
[41.2   43.1] 
 
Enrollees in the 30th percentile  
(N = 133) 
.886 
[.732   1.04] 
44.0 
[42.6   44.4] 
Non-enrollees in the 70th percentile 
(N = 940) 
-.370 
[-.423   -.317] 
41.9 
[41.2   42.7] 





Chapter 4 Appendix Table 4  Characteristics of variables used in chapter 4 analysis  
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Enrollment in GATE 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
IQ test score -0.01 1.00 -2.14 3.47 
Academic enrichment  0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Parent advocacy 2.11 1.05 0 3 
Neighborhood advocacy 57.67 13.54 21.28 93.94 
High minority 
neighborhood 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Parent threat credibility -0.01 1.01 -2.17 2.63 
Neighborhood threat 









Table 2 represents the model fit for the student-level analysis.  It reports how student 
characteristics affect the probability of enrollment in gifted and talented education within 
each neighborhood.  Here, all of the effects are modeled as fixed across neighborhoods so 
that they have the same impact in each neighborhood.  I had hoped to model parent threat 
credibility as varying across neighborhoods, but doing so produces a statistically 
insignificant result.  This means that parent threat credibility has a constant effect and 
does not vary by neighborhood.  I was also not able to run separate analyses for each 
racial and ethnic group.  Due to the distribution of residents, the within-neighborhood 
sample sizes became so small in some cases that running separate analyses for each race 
and ethnicity group meant losing up to fifty-percent of the sample.    
 










Intercept     
Intercept G00 -2.56*** (.111) 0.077 -- -- 
IQ slope 
  Intercept, G10  0.450*** (.073) 1.57 1.00 1.56 
Parent threat slope 
Intercept, G20 0.263** (.077) 1.29 1.00 1.29 
African American slope 
Intercept, G30 0.287 (.264) 1.33 -- -- 
Hispanic slope 
Intercept, G40 -0.374 (.240) 0.688 -- -- 
Spanish slope 
Intercept, G50  -.955* (.429) 0.385 -- -- 
Parent advocacy slope     
Intercept, G60 0.131~ (.073) 1.14 1.05 1.20 
Academic enrichment slope     
Intercept, G70  0.416 (.254) 1.52 0.27 0.410 
     





Intercept 1, u0j 0.460 0.212** 123.3 0.229 
FUM τ00 = 0.311     
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 Proprietary Threat and the Participation Paradox in Gifted and Talented 
Education: A Multiple-Level Mixed Methods Theory of Resource Distribution answers 
the following question: What explains the persistent disparate enrollment of black 
students in gifted and talented education programs?  Gifted and talented education (of 
GATE) is a K-12 education program that introduces critical thinking skills and advanced 
analytical techniques to students earlier and at a faster pace than the general curriculum.  
The drastic and persistent under-enrollment of black students in GATE has been 
attributed to teacher bias against black students, a lack of knowledge about how 
giftedness manifests itself in black youth, and the apathy of black parents in the 
identification process.  In response, researchers and policymakers have looked for more 
efficient and accurate ways to measure and identify giftedness, worked to develop and 
disseminate policies that would clarify the identification process, and created programs 
and policies to involve more parents in the gifted identification process.   To varying 
degrees and in different places these interventions have modified enrollment patterns; yet, 
the enrollment disparity remains and is still quite large.  If these interventions have not 
worked, then are the disparities simply a reflection of student ability or is there some 
other explanation?  
 I have argued that disparate enrollment persists because of a participation paradox 






in the identification process. However, educators are resistant when members of the black 
community advocate for access to GATE in the same ways that white parents do so 
because these forms of participation threaten educators’ status as identification experts.  
More specifically, I argue that the distribution of GATE enrollments is a function of how 
state and federal governments structure the relationship between education advocates 
(parents and community members) and educators (teachers and administrators).   I find 
that educational outcomes are less a function of teacher bias and parent motivation than 
they are a function of strategic professional responses to political pressure.  
Legislation governing gifted and talented education can contain two levels of 
accountability: one between parents and school districts, the other between states and 
school districts.  In states that take responsibility for underrepresentation – both  
identifying the underrepresentation of African American students in gifted and talented 
education as a problem and positioning themselves as working to remedy disparate 
enrollment, legislation is attentive both levels of accountability.  In these “policy 
administrator” states, legislations delineate a complete plan for gifted and talented 
education -- including goals, monitoring procedures, and mechanisms for settling 
disputes.  The legislations in states that do not take responsibility for underrepresentation 
in gifted programs only outline one dimension of accountability.   
In states where legislation outlines the relationship between school districts and 
parents, the legislations assign many tasks to parents and delegate many of the states’ 
tasks regarding education to professionals bound by career norms.  In these “policy 






are managed by professional norms.  In states where legislation outlines the relationship 
between the state and educators, identification tasks are delegated to educators who have 
the final say about who gets into gifted programs.  I refer to these as “service provider” 
states.  African Americans are under-enrolled at the highest levels in these states. 
My research shows that in the case of gifted and talented education in the United 
States, meritocracy is democracy.  The enrollment rates of African American students 
vary with the ways that states regulate the identification process for program 
participation. In states where the African American community is empowered to 
participate in the identification process, African American student enrollment in the 
program is higher than in states that do not incorporate the African American community 
into the identification process.  Moreover, in these so-called participatory environments, 
the advocacy of parents and community members and the threat of intervention from 
parents and the African American community combined are stronger predictors of 
enrollment than is a student’s IQ test scores.  Thus, a program that we presume operates 
by meritocratic standards is in fact a production of our democratic processes.    
 
